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700 Families to Feed: The Challenge of
Corporate Citizenship
Tara J Radin*
ABSTRACT

When Howard Lutnick, CEO of Cantor Fitzgerald, was first
interviewed after September 11, 2001, a tragedy that devastated
his firm and stole the life of his brother, Lutnick stated that he
now had "700 families to feed." The view that he expressed was
that his firm was responsible to the families of the wage earners
lost in the tragedy, even though the firm was not responsible for
the events that had occurred.
Such assumed corporate
responsibility, consistent with a stakeholder-based approach to
management, is often considered to conflict with the law. The
purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that stakeholder
management does not inherently conflict with the law. In fact,
principles of stakeholder thinking coincide with our moral
intuitions, reflect many demonstrated best business practices,
and promote profit-generation as envisioned and advocated by
the law.
This Article explores the nature of stakeholder
relationships and their impact on business enterprises. The
interconnected experiences of individuals and organizations in
the wake of the events of September 11, while exemplary and
perhaps more pronounced, are not isolated. The purpose of this
Article is to draw upon such experiences in order to move beyond
the traditional hub-and-spoke model of the firm, and to
integrate past and present examples in a more dynamic,
stakeholder-based model of corporate citizenship that bridges
the gap between stakeholder thinking and the law and is both
descriptive and normative.

* Assistant Professor, Frank G. Zarb School of Business, Hofstra University. B.A.,
University of Virginia; J.D./M.B.A., University of Virginia School of Law / Darden
Graduate School of Business Administration; Ph.D., Darden Graduate School of
Business Administration. The Author would like to thank the William Davidson
Institute and participants in the University of Michigan's Conference on Corporate
Governance and Sustainable Peace for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Special thanks to Tim Fort and Cindy Schipani, the Conference's faculty organizers.
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I. INTRODUCTION: CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE

When Howard Lutnick, CEO of Cantor Fitzgerald, was first
interviewed after September 11, 2001, a tragedy that devastated his
firm and stole the life of his brother, Lutnick stated that he now had
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"700 families to feed."' The view that he expressed was that his firm
was responsible to the families of the wage earners lost in the
tragedy, though the firm was not responsible for the events that had
occurred. 2 Such assumed corporate responsibility, consistent with a
stakeholder-based approach to management, is often considered to
conflict with the law. 3 The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate
that stakeholder management does not inherently conflict with the
law. In fact, principles of stakeholder thinking coincide with our
moral intuitions, reflect many demonstrated best business practices,
and promote profit-generation as envisioned and advocated by the
law. This Article explores the nature of stakeholder relationships
The interconnected
and their impact on business enterprises.
experiences of individuals and organizations in the wake of the events
of September 11, while exemplary and perhaps more pronounced, are
not isolated. The purpose of this Article is to draw upon such
experiences in order to move beyond the traditional hub-and-spoke
model of the firm, and to integrate past and present examples in a
more dynamic, stakeholder-based model of corporate citizenship that
bridges the gap between stakeholder thinking and the law and is both
descriptive and normative.
While, as evidenced by the virtually unprecedented, politically
motivated assault on capitalism that took place on September 11,
global politics and business have become increasingly intertwined,
questions relating to sustainable peace are being discussed in new
contexts such as business. 4 Business enterprises are no longer
isolated from or immune to global politics. 5 Although business
scholarship has not traditionally tackled questions of sustainable
peace in any depth, as Jeffrey Nesteruk has noted, "[t]his does not
mean, of course, that such an inquiry is an inappropriate one. Posing
new questions is one of the central roles of legal theory. Even when
the outcome of such inquiries is uncertain, asking novel questions can
be fruitful, sometimes in unforeseen ways."6 An immediate question
comes to mind: If business is linked to sustainable peace, as is

Howard Lutnick, CEO of Cantor Fitzgerald, Describes His Feelings After
1.
Loosing 700 Employees on Tuesday's Attacks (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 14,
2001).

2.
3.

Id.
R. Edward Freeman, Corporate Governance: A Stakeholder Interpretation,

19 J. BEHAV. ECON. 337, 346-49 (1990).

4.
See Eric W. Orts, War and the Business Corporation, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 549, 550 (2002). "[T]he topic of war ... is not ordinarily considered
germane to academic studies of corporate law." Id. at 550.
5.
Id. at 551.
"While there is a rich literature exploring corporate social responsibility,
6.
the role of the corporation in promoting peace has not been the focus of scholarly
inquiry." Jeffery Nesteruk, Conceptions of the Corporation and the Prospects of
Sustainable Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 437, 438 (2002).
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perhaps demonstrated by the attack on the World Trade Center, how
does this influence our understanding of business?
In the wake of September 11, dialogue regarding the relationship
between business enterprises and sustainable peace has become a
springboard topic for us to consider how our business models and
legal principles can be integrated into stronger descriptive models
with both normative and instrumental implications. 7 Stakeholder
thinking provides a useful lens through which to view business
enterprises, particularly in terms of engagement, development, and
In exploring the role of business enterprises in
recovery.8
contributing to sustainable peace, this Article offers a stakeholderbased approach as a viable metaphor for business. 9
Although stakeholder thinking has frequently been construed to
be in conflict with the legal principle of shareholder primacy,' 0 there
are indications that stakeholder thinking does not inherently conflict
with the law."
The purpose of corporate law is to protect the
12
investment of shareholders and to guard their potential profits.
Stakeholder thinking does not inherently challenge the rights of
shareholders as residual claimants. 13 On the contrary, arguments in

7.
As stakeholder thinking has developed, its nature (i.e., descriptive,
normative, or instrumental) has been widely discussed and debated. See Thomas
Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts,
Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65 (1995). For development of
particular dimensions, see, for example, Thomas M. Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder
Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 404 (1995); Kevin
Gibson, The Moral Basis of Stakeholder Theory, 26 J. Bus. ETHICS 245 (2000); R.
Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions, 4 Bus.
ETHICS Q. 409 (1994).
8.
It can be argued that capitalism has a moral component. A number of
scholars have explored the connection between capitalism and morality. See, e.g.,
Norman E. Bowie, A Kantian Theory of Capitalism, in NEW APPROACHES TO BUSINESS
ETHICS 37 (Ruffin Series 1998); Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate
Governance in a Global Environment: The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829 (2000).
9.
There are several alternative metaphors for business. See, e.g., Timothy L.
Fort & James J. Noone, Banded Contracts, Mediating Institutions, and Corporate
Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of Contractual Theories of the Firm, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 163 (1999).
10.
See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate Management to Do
Good at the Expense of Shareholder Gain-A Survey of, and Commentary on, the U.S.
Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7 (1988). According to Davis, "The bedrock principle
of U.S. corporate law remains that maximization of shareholder value is the polestar of
managerial decisionmaking." Id. at 8.
11.
D. Gordon Smith, The ShareholderPrimacy Norm, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 277,
280 (1998).
12.
Id.
For a discussion about residual claimants, see Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not13.
So-Bad Arguments for ShareholderPrimacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192-95 (2002).
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in general,
favor of stakeholder management hold that stakeholders
14
including shareholders, benefit from such an approach.
Part II of this Article deals with stakeholder theory and the law.
It begins by confronting and resolving perceived conflicts between
stakeholder thinking and the law. This Article explores the role of
law with regard to business enterprises such as corporations. The
Article outlines the legal context and environment in which business
enterprises operate and traces the rise of shareholder primacy. Part
III then presents an overview of the development of thinking during
the past 20 years, beginning with the 1984 publication of R. Edward
Freeman's Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach.15 This is
followed by Part IV, which endeavors to bridge the gap between
stakeholder thinking and the law and reveal that stakeholder
thinking is consistent with and supportive of legal principles.
The story of the September 11 devastation of the World Trade
Center in New York is retold in Part V. 16 Business ethics relies on
storytelling to create connections between people and to provide
models for behavior. 17 In this instance, the story is not of a single
business enterprise, but of a community of business enterprises and
stakeholders. Essential to this story are the roles of networks of
stakeholder relationships in contributing to the recovery and
rebuilding of downtown New York. In Part VI, the Article connects
lessons from September 11 to a broader model of corporate
citizenship. Emphasis is placed on the movement toward a relational
model, as opposed to the traditional hub-and-spoke model originally
proposed by Freeman. Current approaches to stakeholder thinking
have shifted the focus from the individual stakeholders to the
interconnected stakeholder relationships that underlie and influence
business enterprises. Finally, in Part VII, the Article concludes by
Business
linking corporate citizenship to sustainable peace.
enterprises play an integral role in sustainable peace through their
participation in the stakeholder networks that underlie their
organizations and society in general.

14.

Id. at 1208.

15.
See generally R. EDWARD
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984).

FREEMAN,

STRATEGIC

MANAGEMENT:

A

The purpose of this Article is not to ignore the other tragedies of September
16.
11, including the plane crashes in Washington, D.C., and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, or
to suggest in any way that they were not similarly horrific. Because this Article is not
about terrorism in general, though, it focuses primarily on the impact of the events of
September 11 on business enterprises in New York and their stakeholders.
17.
There is considerable support within business ethics scholarship for the
development of storytelling and metaphors as teaching and learning tools. See, e.g.,
Andrew C. Wicks et al., A Feminist Reinterpretationof the Stakeholder Concept, 4 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 475 (1994).
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LEGAL TREATMENT OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

In order to determine both the contribution and controversy of
stakeholder thinking, it is important to view it within the context of
the legal environment for business enterprises. In many ways, the
treatment of business enterprises by the law has stemmed from their
artificiality. Business entities are inherently "fictitious. '18 State
codes structure their incorporation and existence. 19 These codes
provide for the issuance of stock to shareholders, who are considered
the owners of the entities. 20 Managers are then designated to control
operations in their interests. 21 The relationship between managers
and shareholders is considered fiduciary in nature. This has given
rise to the notion of shareholder primacy-that managers are
expected to pursue profit maximization. 22 Economic thinking has
also become increasingly popular within legal scholarship and
23
jurisprudence.
While this is not necessarily true in other countries, where the
24
legal infrastructure supports attention to a variety of stakeholders,
the tradition in the United States has been to assume that nonshareholder stakeholders are without rights. 25 In fact, this is not
entirely true. 26
While non-shareholder stakeholders are given
general protection, there is abundant legislation that specifies
situations where stakeholder concerns actually trump shareholder

18.
ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 416-26 (1976).
19.
For a discussion of state control over corporations, see id. According to
Conard, it is a natural consequence of federalism. "[T]he effect of [the Constitution's]
saying nothing," Conard asserted, "was to permit the states to continue granting
corporate status under the doctrine of reserved powers." Id. at 6. Gregory A. Mark has
argued that Conard's account is overly simplistic. See generally Gregory A. Mark, The
Court and the Corporation: Jurisprudence, Localism, and Federalism, 1997 SuP. CT.
REV. 403 (1997). Mechanically, it is true that the doctrine of reserved powers
legitimizes state control. There was, though, more going on "behind the scenes," so to
speak. According to Mark, the system we have ended up with is not the natural result
of federalism, but, in actuality, nothing more than an "accident" resulting from a web of
contradictory and complementary "phenomena." Id. at 406.
20.
For a general discussion that traces the development of corporate law and
governance in the United States, see JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: 1780-1970 (1970); see also
JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS (1917).
21.
See CONARD, supra note 18, at 416-26.

22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
See generally Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in
China: Then and Now, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2002).
25.
See HURST, supra note 20, at 31-49.
26.
Id. at 52-80.
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concerns. 27 In addition, fiduciary law does not preclude managerial
responsibilities to other stakeholders as well. 28 In fact, convincing
arguments can be and have been made that attention to multiple
overall profitability in the longstakeholders can actually enhance
29
term if not the short-term as well.
Legal treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders is
influenced by a number of factors. The state codes that structure
corporate organizations play a foundational role, as does our
State and
understanding and interpretation of fiduciary law. 30
federal legislation and common law also serve to protect fundamental
rights of general stakeholders. 31 In addition, legal treatment of
stakeholders is heavily influenced by basic understandings of the role
32
of the corporation, as through alternative theories of the firm.
Economic interpretations of the firm have tended myopically to
33
endorse shareholder primacy without regard for other stakeholders.
Broader interpretations of the firm, which incorporate both its
historical development and its increasingly expansive role in society,
tend to allow for attention to the concerns of shareholders and other
34
stakeholders.
A. Theories of the Firm
Theories of the firm-why it exists and what its nature is-have
fascinated scholars, practitioners, and jurists for the past two
centuries. 3 5 They have explored the philosophical, social, political,
and economic dimensions of corporate theory in a way that has
proved both engaging and provocative. 36 Interestingly, no single,

See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ff (2001);
27.
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1993); Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-117 (1990).
HURST, supra note 20, at 234-35.
28.
Although arguments have been made that managerial responsibilities to
29.
stakeholders are multifiduciary in nature, this Article does not take that position. See,
e.g., Freeman, supra note 7, at 409.
30.
CONRAD, supra note 18, at 3-8.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
(1990).
36.

HURST, supra note 20, at 13-17.

See generally id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,2 DUKE L.J. 201, 201
Id.

While apparently metaphysical questions about "the nature of the corporation"
might strike one as vaguely continental and surely alien to our hard-headed,
pragmatic legal culture, theorizing about "what corporations are" has in fact
occupied a great deal of home-grown mental energy and has played an
important role in arguments about concrete questions of corporate law.
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authoritative, comprehensive account of the corporation has
emerged. 37 Instead, multiple theories coexist.38 It appears, though,
that contractual views of the corporation are particularly popular
39
within the legal community.
It is important to place this within the context of the historical
development of corporations. Law created the corporate form, and
then the theories developed retrospectively. 40 Interestingly, many of
the theories overlook the roots of the corporate form. 4 1 While the
corporation is perceived as profit-generation tool for individuals, this
42
Most of
is not actually how corporations were initially envisioned.
the early corporations were public utilities, and the corporate form
43
was created to promote such services.
Morton J. Horwitz is credited with one of the more accepted
accounts of the theories of the corporation. 44 He contends that theory
development has often actually followed case decisions.4 5 In his
opinion, leading cases, such as Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific
Railroad, were not necessarily based on particular theories of the
firm, but actually anticipated the theories they have been used to
46
support.
In Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory,
he addressed the intellectual climate during various time periods in
U.S. history.4 7 Horwitz offered his interpretation of the doctrinal
origins of theories of the corporation through a step-by-step history of
the evolution of the traditional theories of the corporation. 48 He
tackled the puzzling and complex Santa Clara case, and

37.

38.

See id.
See id.

39.
Contractual theories of the firm have also emerged as significant within the
field of business ethics. See, e.g., T. DONALDSON & T. W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A
SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BuSINEss ETHICS (1999).
40.
See CONARD, supra note 18, at 124-51.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.

44.

Michael J. Phillips, Reapprising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation,

21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1081 (1994).

45.

See generally Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development

of CorporateTheory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985).
46.
Santa Clara Co. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a
State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.

Id.
47.
48.

Id.
See generally Horwitz, supra note 45.
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demonstrated how it has been misinterpreted. 49 Whereas it has often
been credited with the birth of the natural entity theory, Horwitz
asserted that it was roughly a decade after the Santa Clara decision
before the natural entity theory emerged, and it was only then that
Santa Clara began to stand for the establishment of dramatically new
constitutional protections for corporations as a result of their "legal
personhood." 50 Numerous authors have subsequently relied upon
Horwitz's account to explore traditional theories further and to delve
into modern theories. 5 1
While Horwitz's approach has proved useful in many ways, it
suggests that the theories are temporally based, which is not entirely
correct. 52 The emergence of new theories has not caused the complete
reversal of older theories. 53 David Million has suggested that
theories of the corporation can also be viewed according to the
54
questions they confront.
It can be argued that there are two general groups of theories of
the corporation: the traditional theories and the modern theories. 5 5
What distinguishes these theories is their reliance on economic
thought. 56
There has always been controversy regarding the
theoretical foundation for the corporation. 57 Prior to the early 1900s,
the focal points surrounded the philosophical, social, and political
dimensions of the corporation.5" Then, in the early part of this
century, a school of thought, called "law and economics," began to
develop, which challenged traditional thinking. 59 Accompanying this
new school of thought were new theories of the firm. 60 Modern
economic theories of the corporation thus emerged that marked a

49.
See supra note 46 (quoting Santa Clara Co., 118 U.S. at 396).
50.
Horwitz, supra note 45, at 174. "[T]he so-called 'natural entity' or 'real
entity' theory of the corporation that the Santa Claracase is supposed to have adopted
was nowhere to be found in American legal thought when the case was decided,"
Horwitz explains. Id. "Whose who argued for the corporation as well as Supreme
Court Justice Stephen Field, who decided in favor of the corporation in two elaborate
circuit court opinions ...clearly had no conception of a natural entity theory of the
corporation." Id.
51.
See, e.g., Millon, supra note 35.
52.
Id. at 240.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 229-31.
57.
See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizingthe Impersonal: Corporationsand the Bill
of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 580-81 (1990).
58.
See, e.g., id. at 580-82; see also Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The
Progressive History of Organizational "Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575,
579-85 (1989).
59.
See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-77 (1989).
60.
Id. at 1476-82 (describing different economic theories of the firm).
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radical departure from traditional thinking.6 1 The concerns that
were most prominent in traditional theories are virtually
62
inconsequential according to modern theories.
Traditional theories can be characterized by their focus on a
certain set of interesting questions.6 3 According to these theories, it
is the philosophical, social, and political dimensions of the corporation
that serve to fuel the controversy: whether the corporation is natural
or artificial, whether it is a separate entity or an aggregate, and
whether it represents a public or private concern. 64 One subset of the
traditional theories questions the relationship between the
corporation and law. 65 Some people argue that the corporation is
primarily a legal classification, whereas others contend that is rooted
in private ventures unconnected to the law.6 6 Another subset aims
toward defining what the corporation actually is. 67 There is a view
that the corporation develops into an entity of its own, separate from
its members, such as its shareholders. 68 Competing with this is the
view that the corporation is merely the aggregate of its members. 69 A
third subset challenges the public/private distinction. 70 People who
consider the corporation a "public" entity tend to acknowledge an

61.
Id. at 1493 ("[Llegal theories respecting the management corporation
changed substantially around 1930.").
62.
See also id. at 1508-09 (noting the disappearance of past corporate
conflicts).
63.
See generally id. at 1482-94.
64.
Phillips, supra note 44, at 1082; see also Bratton, supra note 59, at 1484.
65.
Bratton, supra note 59, at 1502-06 (discussing corporations as an artificial
body created by law and the legal action doctrine).
66.
Phillips, supranote 44, at 1064, 1068-69.
67.
Bratton, supra note 59, at 1503 (describing one of the definitions of
"corporation").
68.
This is the "natural entity" theory of the firm. According to this view, the
corporation is a natural entity, whose existence is defined by law, which exists as more
than an artificial endeavor.
Corporations engage in real activities with real
consequences. Whereas "incorporation," the process through which a corporation is
officially formed, is a legal process, the firm operating as a "corporation" establishes a
presence in society and in the local community that often extends far beyond what the
legal definition indicates. The argument is thus that corporations are "real" entities,
which, regardless of their "fictitious" roots, develop independent identities that position
them as legal "persons." See CONARD, supra note 18, at 441-44; see also Bratton, supra
note 59, at 1504.
69.
The hallmark of this, the "aggregate entity" theory, is its refusal to admit
the existence of a distinct corporate entity, except, perhaps, for that created by law.
Robert Hessen, for example, contends that "[a] group or association is only a concept, a
mental construct, used to classify different types of relationships between individuals."
R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION 41 (1979). According to the "aggregate
entity" theory, the corporation is merely the sum of its parts-nothing more, nothing
less. Id. Clearly, according to Michael Phillips, "If corporations are creatures of state
law and nothing else, they almost certainly must be artificial, invisible, intangible, and
fictional." Phillips, supra note 44, at 1064.
70.
Bratton, supra note 59, at 1497-98.
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array of rights and responsibilities, often dubbed "social"
responsibilities, that people who consider the corporation a "private"
entity tend to ignore. 71 Whereas the first two types of theories
explore the nature of the corporation, the third type attempts to
determine the nature of corporate activity-what is appropriate or
72
legitimate, and what is not.
B. Law and Economics
Economic thinking has proved influential on the development of
jurisprudence. 73 The foundation of the legal approach to corporations
is often traced back to the 1932 publication of The Modern
Corporationand Public Property.74 In their seminal book, Adolf A.
Berle and Gardiner C. Means underscore the problems that emerge
as a result of the separation of ownership and control between
corporate shareholder investors and corporate managers. 75
Selfdealing, for example, is an ongoing concern. 76 Because the managers
are in charge of other people's money, it is important that they make
77
decisions based on what is best for the investors, not themselves.
Berle and Means have thus opened the door to waves of literature
exploring the ramifications of this separation, for shareholders,
78
managers, and the corporation.
At about the same time, economist Ronald Coase began an
inquiry into the nature of the firm enterprise.7 9 His article, The

71.
See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 44, at 1069; see also Bratton, supra note 59, at
1497-98.
72.
The fact that rights are attributed to the corporation as a separate entity,
coupled with the growing body of corporate law, dedicated to the regulation of the
corporate entity, serves to enhance the perception of the corporation as a "real entity."
This is the "real entity" theory of the corporation. Phillips, supra note 44, at 1067-70.
73.
See generally Bratton, supra note 59, at 1494-1501 (discussing the new
economic theory).
74.
See Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder
Participationin Corporate Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV.
379, 383-84 (1994) (noting that the BERLE & MEANS, infra note 75, book was "most
influential"); see also Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11
GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 101 (1989).
75.
A.A. BERLE, JR. & G. C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 113-15 (1968).
76.
Id. at 115-16.
77.
Id. at 116.
78.
The legal system plays an important role, according to Berle and Means, for
both government and legal intervention are necessary in order to control the potential
indiscretion of managers. Id. at 196-97. More than 50 years after they first articulated
their concerns, the legal theory that governs shareholder-manager relations, fiduciary
law, is essentially the type of theory that Berle and Means call for. It emphasizes the
private property interests of the shareholder investors, and asserts that the managers
are obliged by law to protect those interests. Id.
79.
See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937).
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Nature of the Firm, published in 1937, called into question many of
the assumptions of traditional economics, and suggested that the
focus on external market transactions was misplaced.8 0 According to
Coase, it is the pricing mechanism associated with internal
transactions that leads to the creation of firms.8 1 In other words,
firms exist because it is more cost effective to combine efforts through
8 2
a firm than to contract separately for everything.
Economists since Coase have tended to lean toward one of two
separate analytic traditions.8 3 Those following Coase, the "bargain
model" theorists, assume the virtual absence of transaction costs in
order explore the significance of different legal rules.8 4 It is the

80.
Id.; see also R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1
(1961).
81.
Coase, supra note 79, at 388-93.
82.
Coase steals from us the refuge of traditional "fairness" and causation in
dealing with conflicts that arise. He instead leaves us to look for the "cheapest cost
avoider." It does not matter, according to Coase, who is culpable. Instead, he focuses
on how the situation can most easily be rectified. The goal is to have parties bargain
between themselves. They are best situated to value their own benefits and harms and
reach a compromise to at least mitigate some of the resulting harm. Id. at 389-400. In
many cases, the court recognizes the reciprocal nature of the problem-that both
parties are in risk of harm-and, at least at times, will place the burden of liability
upon the party that is in the best position to afford it, to encourage that party to
bargain with the other party.
83.
See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fundamental Themes in Business
Law Education: Contractarianismin the Business Associations Classroom: Kovaak v.
Reed and the Allocation of Capital Losses in Service Partnerships,34 GA. L. REV. 631,
631-36 (discussing generally the application of the theories).
84.
See, e.g., A.A. Alchian & H. Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 780 (1972). Although Alchian and
Demsetz follow in the tradition of Coase in their questioning of traditional assumptions
about the nature of the firm, they challenge his contention that the price mechanism
and competition were characteristics present in markets but not in firms. Id. at 778.
They do not see meaningful differences between intra-firm and extra-firm economic
principles. See id. at 785. They therefore paint a picture of the firm that draws
parallels between what Coase sees outside the firm and what they see inside. Id. at
783-85. Alchian and Demsetz argue that the firm, itself, has no separate existence.
Corporations have "no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action." Id. at 777.
Parties are considered rational, self-interested economic actors, who often exhibit
conflicting interests, even though all parties are considered to be motivated by the
pursuit of wealth maximization. Id. The contracts between these parties represent
instantaneous exchanges that are the result of choice and compromise, in the face of
both competition and relative uncertainty. Id. at 777-79. Alchian and Demsetz have
thus been credited with laying the foundation upon which the notion of a managerial
corporation has been built. Id. They are considered to have originated the view of the
corporation as a "nexus of contracts." Jeffrey N. Gordon, Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1599 n.1 (1989); see also Bratton, supra note
59, at 1494-1501 (discussing generally economic theory); J. H. Barton, The Economic
Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL. STUD. 277 (1972); A. T. Kronman,
Mistake, Disclosure,Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978);
George L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARv. L. REV. 960 (1978)
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interplay of the rules in the initial bargaining environment that
intrigues these theorists.8 5 The "transaction cost" theorists, on the
other hand, are concerned with the initial bargaining environment
itself.8 6 Their contention is that it is not possible to allocate all
possible risks at the time of contracting.8 7 Their goal lies in the

(applying economic theory to the costs imposed by nonconforming tenders);
COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-ABA
SYMPOSIUMS 1977-1978 (Donald E. Schwartz ed., 1979) (containing works on different
economic perspectives by multiple authors).
85.
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 307
(1976). While the Alchian and Demsetz model applies to private ownership, Jensen
and Meckling identify the consequences of public ownership. See id.; Alchian &
Demsetz, supra note 84, at 777-78. In addition, whereas Alchian and Demsetz explore
the nature of management, Jensen and Meckling focus on corporate governance and
emphasize the financial implications of firm operations. See Jensen & Meckling, supra,
at 305-07; Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 84, at 789. Jensen and Meckling introduced
the financial model that has provided the basis for further development of "law and
economics" and the contractual theory of the corporation. See Jensen & Meckling,
supra, at 312. They argue that the external dynamics of firm activities are similar to
the firm's internal dynamics. Id. Jensen and Meckling contend that managers serve
as agents for the shareholders. Id. at 309. They are thus responsible for making
decisions that have direct consequences on the shareholders' interests. See id. Unity
of control and ownership is not necessary for efficient and effective firm performance,
according to Jensen and Meckling. Id. at 330-33; see also Butler, supra note 74, at 108
(discussing opportunities for shareholders).
86.
Butler, supra note 74, at 103-04.
87.
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1428 (1989); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 16-17 (1991). Easterbrook and Fischel have
been lauded as the foremost architects of the contractual interpretation of the
corporation. See William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual
Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 180, 180-81 (1992). Whereas those before them
introduced the "nexus of contract" idea, they are responsible for laying out the
particulars of a contractual approach to contract law, first in their 1989 article, The
Corporate Contract, followed subsequently by their more comprehensive 1992 book, The
Economic Structure of Corporate Law. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, supra; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW, supra. Easterbrook and Fischel underscore the contract metaphor as a new way
of analyzing corporations and corporate law. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, supra, EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE

LAW, supra. They argue that corporations, a subset of firms, represent a myriad of
freely-bargained contractual arrangements. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, supra, at 1425-26. They are careful, in using such a metaphor, though, to
distinguish the corporate view of contract from other views, such as the political view.
See id. "We often speak ... of the corporation as a 'nexus of contracts' or a set of
implicit and explicit contracts," as Easterbrook and Fischel assert. Id. at 1426.
This reference, too, is shorthand for the complex arrangements of many sorts
that those who associate voluntarily in the corporation will work out among
themselves. The form of reference is a reminder that the corporation is a
voluntary adventure, and that we must always examine the terms on which
real people have agreed to participate.
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pursuit of ways to reduce the transaction costs in complex contraction
88
relationships (i.e., relational contracts).
While these approaches are admittedly different, together they
comprise the convergence of law and economics in a way traditionally
considered inappropriate.8 9
Whereas law and economics have
traditionally been considered at odds, the field of "law and
economics," which has gained increasing acceptance during the past
few decades, has set a new course for a great deal of legal scholarship
and decision-making. 90
It has laid the foundation for a new,
contractually based, economic theory of the corporation, which has, in
turn, influenced both legislation and jurisprudence. 9 1

Id. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, what distinguishes corporate contracts, and
the contract theory as applied to corporations, is that corporate contracts are real. Id.
at 1429. 'The corporate venture has many real contracts," they explain. Id. 'The
terms present in the articles of incorporation at the time the firm is established or
issues stock are real agreements. Everything to do with the relation between the firm
and the suppliers of labor (employees), goods and services (suppliers and contractors) is
contractual."
Id.
The contribution of Easterbrook and Fischel has thus been
fundamental. They join two previously disparate fields-law and economics-in a way
that has proved influential in both legal analysis and legal construction. They do not
entirely supplant corporate law, but they do redefine its scope, for, according to
Easterbrook and Fischel, "The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit
contracts, and corporate law enables the participants to select the optimal
arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities that are available in
a large economy." Id. at 1418.
88.
See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 426 (1976) (analyzing regulation and institutional choice
through economic theory); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72
Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); see also Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981).
According to the traditional model of contracts, people engage in contractual
relationships in order to benefit from mutual cooperation. Id. at 1089. They make
exchanges, of products or services, for example, in order for mutual benefit. Id. Such
exchanges are not without expected risks, but those risks are expected and, therefore,
assumed to be incorporated into the bargaining process-either specifically by the
bargaining parties or generally by legal rules or prescriptions. Id. at 1089-90. Goetz
and Scott argue that there are some types of contractual relationships that are not
covered by the traditional model. Id. These contracts, so-called "relational" contracts,
are unusual in both their duration and degree of interactivity. Id. This translates into
greater uncertainty and unpredictability with regard to the risks. Id.
Future
contingencies are not easily anticipated. Id. at 1090-91. "Not surprisingly," Goetz and
Scott point out, "parties who find it advantageous to enter into such cooperative
exchange relationships seek specially adapted contractual devices." Id. at 1090.
89.
See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 407-09 (1989) (noting that "law and
economics writers recast corporate law in its terms").
90.
See id. at 410.
91.
See generally id. (discussing generally the influence law and economics has
had throughout the century).
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C. FiduciaryLaw and ManagerialDecision-Making
The separation of ownership and control in business enterprises
dates back to Berle and Means and has lead to the development of
fiduciary law. 92 Because managers make decisions that affect the
profitability of the stock owned by shareholders, managers are
93
considered to have fiduciary responsibilities to those shareholders.
Managers are expected to make decisions in the interest of
94
shareholders, not for personal gain.
According to fiduciary law there are certain relationships, based
on trust, which place one person, or entity, in control over the
interests-usually, though not always, financial-of another person
96
or entity.95 These relationships are called "fiduciary" relationships.
While contracts, or agreements of some sort, often lay the
groundwork for these sorts of relationships, there is little, if any,
direct attention paid to spelling out many of the relevant rights and
responsibilities. 97 Fiduciary law operates as something "stricter than
the morals of the market-place," said Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v.
Salmon, because it involves "the punctilio of an honor the most
'98
sensitive.
Fiduciary relationships emerge in situations where financial
interests are at stake. 99 "The term 'fiduciary' itself was adopted to
apply to situations falling short of 'trusts,' but in which one person
was nonetheless obliged to act like a trustee," explained Deborah A.
DeMott.100 In fiduciary relationships, owners of the interests benefit
or suffer from the consequences of the decisions made by fiduciaries,
but remain mere beneficiaries without any control over the specific
decisions made with regard to their interests. 1 Fiduciaries are not
beneficiaries of the interests, or funds, they are charged with
protection of another's interests. 10 2 As Victor Brudney pointed out,

92.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 75, at 112-16; see also Edward S. Herman, The
ALI's Corporate Governance Proposals: Law and Economics: The Limits of the Market
as a Discipline in Corporate Governance, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 530, 532-33 (1985).
93.
Victor Brudney, Contractand FiduciaryDuty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L.
REV. 595, 611-12 (1997).

94.
Id. at 611-12.
95.
Id. at 601-03. For a general overview of fiduciary law, see, for example,
Gerald Hertig, Corporate Governance in the United States as Seen from Europe, 1
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 27, 27 (1998).
96.
See generally Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983).
97.
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary
Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425,426 (1993).
98.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928).
99.
See Brudney, supra note 93, at 595-96.
100.
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 5
DuKE L.J. 879, 880 (1988).
101.
Id. at 880-82.
102.
Id. at 880-81.
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The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that the fiduciary agrees to
act as his principal's alter ego rather than to assume the standard
arm's length stance of traders in a market. Hence the fiduciary is not
armed with the usual wariness that one has in dealing with strangers;
he trusts the principal to deal with him as frankly as he would deal
10 3
with himself-he has bought candor.

In the corporate setting, "fiduciary" is the label often given to the
relationship between corporate shareowners and the corporation (i.e.,
officers, directors, and managers). 10 4 People and entities invest in
corporate activities through the purchase of shares. This purchase, or
investment, is accompanied by a loss of control.10 5 Although the
motivation for such investment is generally profit, there is nothing in
the purchase agreement that guarantees that the investment will
earn a profit.10 6 "Treating managers and directors as fiduciaries
provides an effective mechanism for imposing sanctions when
management fails to exercise its responsibilities to the corporation
properly," Carol B. Swanson asserted.10 7 "This is tantamount to
replacing supervision with deterrence. '0 8
This is where, and why, fiduciary law steps in to govern the
relationship. Duties of care and loyalty emerge in the corporate
setting as restraints upon managerial behavior. 10 9 Corporate profits
do not belong to the managers-they belong to the shareowners. 110
These duties thus compel managers (1) to conduct business in such as
way that contributes toward increasing these profits, and (2) not to
use corporate profits to serve personal purposes, or the purposes of
anyone other than shareowners.11 1

103.
Brudney, supra note 93, at 601-02 n.14.
104.
Fiduciary law affords shareholders "fair expectations."
Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1464, 1466
(1989). For a general discussion of fiduciary law as it operates in the corporate setting,
see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425
(1993).
105.
See Eisenberg, supra note 104, at 1471.
106.
Brudney, supra note 93, at 612.
107.
Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the
Twenty-First Century, 21 J. CORP. L. 417, 434 (1996).
108.
Id.; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Court Has a New Idea on Directors' Duty,
Court Has a New Idea on Directors'Duty,NAT'L L.J. Mar. 2, 1992, at 18 (citing Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (considered the
leading decision in Delaware); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988); Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
Some decisions suggest that directors normally own duties to creditors as well as
shareholders. See, e.g., Coffee, supra (listing Armstrong Manors v. Burns, 14 Cal. Rptr.
335 (1941); Fox v. MGM Grand Hotels, 187 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Cal. App. 1983)). See also
Bratton, supra note 59, at 1471 (providing an overview).
109.
Brudney, supra note 93, at 598.
110.
See id. at 612.
111.
Id. at 612-16; see also Swanson, supra note 107, at 434-36.
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Fiduciary law is currently confronting general challenges
regarding whether it serves as an appropriate vehicle within the
context of corporate law. 112 Fiduciary law is intrinsically linked to
notions of morality. 113 Many contractarians thus argue against the
114
continued reliance on fiduciary principles in the corporate setting.
They believe that the purpose of corporate law is merely to interpret
the underlying contractual relationships and enforce them. 115
"Regarding the fiduciary duties owed by corporate managers to the
corporation and its investors, it was entirely predictable that the
Contractarians advocate that society should have no corporate
116
fiduciary principles," Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., explained.
"Rather, the Contractarians argue that we are better off if society
stays out of the entire matter and leaves private parties (i.e.,
corporate managers and investors) free to contract as they see fit
regarding fiduciary duties. 11 7 Viewing the role of corporate law in
such a way renders fiduciary law virtually irrelevant
to
1 18
corporations.
In spite of questions and criticism from numerous perspectives,
fiduciary law continues to guide fundamental assumptions about
appropriate managerial decision-making. 1 9 It delineates the scope of
managers' relationships with shareholders and assigns particular
rights and responsibilities that are recognized and enforced by the
legal system. 120
Fiduciary law does not necessary preclude
stakeholder thinking, though, for it can be argued that responsible
managers pay attention to stakeholder concerns in order to protect
shareholders.' 2 1 It is only narrow, myopic interpretations of the
fiduciary responsibilities of managers that threaten the ability of
business enterprises to fulfill their responsibilities to shareholders
22
and other stakeholders as well.'

112.
See Brudney, supra note 93, at 595-96 (providing a general overview and
discussing the view that "contract" better characterizes fiduciary duties in corporate
law than "fiduciary" alone).
113.
Id. at 604.

114.

R.B.

Campbell,

Jr.,

Corporate Fiduciary Principles for

the Post-

ContractarianEra,23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 562 (1996).
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of

Directors' Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholders
Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409 (2002).

121.
122.

Id. at 412-13.
Id.
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D. Milton Friedmanand CorporateSocial Responsibilities
Although dialogue concerning corporate social responsibilities
had taken place since the earliest corporations emerged in the United
States, 123 it was not until 1970 that Milton Friedman, noted freemarket economist, addressed the debate head on and provided one of
the most often cited references for the shareholder theory of the
firm. 124 Shareholder primacy is reflected in Friedman's The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, which initially
appeared in the New York Times Magazine on September 13, 1970,
but which has subsequently been reprinted in a wide variety of
sources. 125 Interestingly, while it was published in the popular press
as a "news" article, it addresses, and is relevant to, both scholars and
It remains the leading encapsulation of the
practitioners. 126
127
of firm management.
theory
shareholder
Friedman denounced discussions of the possible "social
responsibilities" of business that had become popular by 1970.128
Practitioners and scholars had begun to explore the depth of
managerial responsibilities. 129 They contended that shareholders
were not the only relevant parties, and that concerns were not purely
First,
Friedman considered this absurd. 131
financial. 130
or
are
shareholders, as the owners of the corporation, also own,
13 2
The managers of the
entitled to, the corporation's profits.
corporation, working on their behalf, as agents, are morally obligated
133
to protect and pursue the interests of the owner-shareholders.
According to Friedman, the interests of the shareholders are
financial, so the obligation of managers must involve profit
Second, Friedman argued that voluntary
maximization. 1 34
contractual relationships between productive constituents, such as

A legendary "debate" took place in an exchange of law review articles in the
123.
early 1930s. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1049 (1931); E.M. Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CorporateManagers are Trustees:
A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365.

124.
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Sept. 13, 1970, at 33.
Id.
125.
Fairfax, supranote 120, at n.100.
126.
Id.
127.
128.
Friedman, supra note 124, at 33.
Id.
129.
130.
Id.
131.

Id.

132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 122.
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employees,
managers, customers, suppliers, and the local
government, underlie corporate affairs. 135
Each constituent is
rewarded according to terms freely agreed upon. 136 It is therefore
implicit in this network of contractual arrangements that the profits
are to be to supplied to the shareholders, just as products and
services are supplied to customers, paychecks are supplied to
137
employees, and so on.

In his article, Friedman questioned how "business," an
inanimate object, can have responsibilities at all. 138 Further, because
managers are employed by the shareholder-owners of businesses,
their responsibilities must be to the owners. 139
And because
shareholder-owners invest in business to earn profits, the managers'
responsibilities must translate into the maximization of those
profits. 140 The responsibility of managers, as agents appointed by
business owners, is, according to Friedman, "to conduct business in
accordance with their [shareholders'] desires, which generally will be
to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied
141
in ethical custom.'
Friedman acknowledged the temptation to attend to other
concerns, "social responsibilities," but contended that such courses of
action inevitably end up eroding corporate profits and therefore
impinge
upon
the
managers'
primary
responsibility
to
shareholders. 14 2
In addition, Friedman argued that managers
motivated by social responsibility spend other people's money toward
inappropriate ends. 143 For example, to refrain from increasing the
price of a product in order to help keep down inflation translates into
lower profits for shareholders. 144 While keeping inflation down is
arguably a noble goal, it does not make it the place of managers to
take steps that might contribute toward such a goal at the expense of
145
shareholder profits.
Interestingly, Friedman suggested that "social responsibility" is
sometimes merely a "cloak" offered for legitimate business

135.
Id. at 124.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Friedman is clearly not alone is this thinking. An entire body of literature
within business ethics addresses this very point in the discussion surrounding the
moral status of the corporation. Id. at 33.
139.
Id. at 122.
140.

Id.

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 122.
Id.

145.

Id.

Id.
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decisions. 14 6 For example, a manager's decision to invest in a
community-for example, to offer education for potential employeesin order to provide for the long-term success of the business is easily
justified, according to Friedman, on grounds other than actual "social
He suggested that references to "social
responsibility.' 1 47
regard
to such decisions, translate into mere
responsibility," with
"window-dressing."1 48 In no way do they suggest that there is a place
49
for managers to be motivated by "social responsibilities.'
Friedman concluded by underscoring the major thrust of his
argument regarding shareholder primacy: Managers are, first and
foremost, responsible for generating corporate profits. 150 "[T]here is
one and only one social responsibility of business," he asserts, "to use
its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits
so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say,
51
engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud."'
Although Friedman articulated a strong argument regarding the
importance of attending to shareholder concerns, he nevertheless
failed to stifle efforts in support of corporate social responsibilities in
scholarship or in practice. 152 Part of the reason for this is that he did
not account for the interconnected stakeholder relationships that
underlie business enterprises and must be recognized and managed
153
for sustainable success.

III. STAKEHOLDER THINKING

In spite of Friedman's argument, the role of the manager and the
place of the corporation in its larger social and communal context
continues to be questioned. 154 Stakeholder thinking provides one
vehicle through which social responsibilities are recognized and
155
shareholder primacy as a guiding principle is challenged.
Stakeholder thinking was initially recognized by the business
ethicists in the mid-1980s; it has since become a model upon which

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 126.
Id.

152.
See generally Lynn A. Stout, Lecture and Commentary on the Social
Responsibility of Corporate Entities: Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002).
153.
See Friedman, supra note 124, at 32.
154.
Stout, supra note 152, at 1190.
155.
Fairfax, supra note 120, at 411-13.
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many businesspeople rely. 15 6 It signifies the recognition that the
corporation has responsibilities to people or entities in addition to
shareholders. 157 Although there are different types of stakeholder
"theories" within the general stakeholder thinking "genre," the basic
shared premise is that there are numerous people or entities that
have "stakes" in the affairs of the firm-that affect or are affected by
firm decisions-andthat they, therefore, have some sort of rights and
responsibilities vis-A-vis their stakeholder relationships with firms
and each other.' 58 Stakeholder theories thus identify these people or
entities (e.g., the firm, managers, employees, customers, suppliers,
communities) and explore the normative relationships between
15 9
them.
A. TraditionalStakeholder Thinking
In 1984, in Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach,
Freeman challenged traditional principles of management by
suggesting that shareholder interests should not be treated as
supreme, but should instead be considered as part of a broader web of
According to Freeman, firms have
stakeholder interests. 160
equivalent moral responsibilities to stakeholders in general
(individuals or entities who affect or are affected by firm
operations). 161 Although Freeman was neither the first person to coin
the term "stakeholder" nor the only opponent of shareholder primacy,
he served as a catalyst for increased and ongoing dialogue and debate
162
regarding managerial responsibilities.
The stakeholder concept did not emerge in a vacuum. Even
before the word "stakeholder" began to appear in the popular press or
scholarly literature, there was considerable conversation about and
support for the idea that a corporation has obligations beyond its
traditionally-accepted fiduciary obligations to shareholders. 63 Once
the term gained popularity, scholars began applying the stakeholder
model to a wide range of situations. 64 Indeed, it has become the

156.

Stout, supra note 152, at 1202.

157.

Id.

158.
Ronn S. Davids, Constituency Statutes: An Appropriate Vehicle for
Addressing TransitionCosts, 28 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 145, 145 n.10 (1995).
159.
Id.
See FREEMAN, supranote 15, at 115.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
163.
See, e.g., Bryan W. Husted, OrganizationalJustice and the Management of
164.
Stakeholder Relations, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 643, 651 (1998); Thomas Donaldson & Lee E.
Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and
Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65 (1995).
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primary model for corporate social responsibility, and its potential is
165
still being explored.
The original stakeholder model proposed was a hub-and-spoke
model, which placed the firm in the center of a set of bilateral
relationships. 166 In this way, the firm was transformed from an
entity on paper into a multidimensional enterprise whose activities
16 7
had tangible consequences.

Shareholder

Competitors

Stakeholder thinking generally aims to dispel a few common
misunderstandings. 16 8 The first common misunderstanding that
stakeholder thinking attacks is that shareholders are the only
legitimate claimholders, or stakeholders. 16 9 This fallacy encompasses
the traditional assumption that a financial investment (e.g., through
stock ownership) is necessary to ground a claim on the firm. 170 On
the contrary, evidence suggests that individuals and entities other
than shareholders have legitimate claims on the firm. 17 1 Employees,
customers, suppliers, the community, and so on, all have legitimate

165.
See, e.g., Archie B. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 Bus. &
Soc'Y 268 (1999); Stelios Zyglidopoulos, The Impact of Accidents on Firms'Reputation
for Social Performance, 40 BUS. AND SoC'Y 416 (2001); Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens &
Hans van Oosterhout, The Confines of Stakeholder Management: Evidence from the
Dutch Manufacturing Sector, 40 J. BUS. ETHICS 387 (2002).
166.
FREEMAN, supra note 15, at 26.
167.
Id. at 33.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Id. at 45.
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claims as a result of their relationship with the firm. 172 Employees,
for example, invest in firms through labor, commitment, and loyalty.
establishes the presence of multiple
Stakeholder thinking thus
1 73
legitimate stakeholders.
Stakeholder thinking also dispels the common misunderstanding
174
Traditional
that shareholders and their interests are primary.
175
It
fiduciary law and corporate law identify shareholder interests.
is true that managers are barred from behaving in fiscally
irresponsible manners, so as to interfere wrongfully with firm
profitability and shareholder returns, but this is not to say that these
are the manager's only concerns. 176 Managers have overriding
responsibilities to other stakeholders, many of which are codified in
federal and state legislation, which define and assert a number of
non-shareholder stakeholder concerns, and protect them from
managers willing to pursue pure profit maximization at the expense
For example, consumer
of non-shareholder stakeholders. 17 7
protection laws, labor and safety laws, and environmental laws offer
protection to a host of stakeholders. 178 Indeed, extensive legislation
actually prioritizes the interests of non-shareholder-stakeholders and
demonstrates that shareholder interests are not inherently
non-shareholderand
Shareholder-stakeholder
primary. 179
treated as significant, with neither
stakeholder concerns are 8both
0
given inherent preference.'
Finally, stakeholder thinking is now moving toward recognition
of the complexity of the stakeholder network. 81' While early versions
of the stakeholder model depict bilateral relationships, it is important
18 2
to recognize that stakeholder relationships are not only bilateral.
In actuality, stakeholder relationships are networked and
interrelated.18 3 Stakeholders have relationships with one another, as
8 4
well as with the firm, and these relationships affect one another.'
Firms, for example, have bilateral relationships with suppliers,

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

176.

Id.

at
at
at
at

55.
45.
31-33.
103.

Steven Wolowitz, Shareholders, Stakeholders and the Law (1996-97), at
177.
http://www.mayerbrown.com/legal/sharehol.asp.
Id.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
181.
Jan Jonker & David Foster, Stakeholder Excellence? Framingthe Evolution
and Complexity of a Stakeholder Perspective of the Firm (2002), at
http://www.cmqr.rmit.edu.au/publications/dfjjicit02exc.pdf.
Id.
182.
183.
Id.
184.

Id.
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employees, communities, and so on.' 8 5 As it turns out, while it is
useful initially to view the core bilateral relationships, they do not tell
the whole story, because of the interconnectedness of the multiple,
18 6
overlapping stakeholder relationships.
B. StakeholderRelationships
Stakeholder thinking underscores the lack of integration of
business and law, for, while it addresses business operations, it does
so with little attention being paid to the role of law.' 8 7 Underlying
legal
principles
and legislation are
assumed, but their
consequences-particularly regarding stakeholder relationships-are
rarely explored.' 88 In spite of the occasional vague references, such
as to "requirements of law,"' 8 9 there have been few efforts aimed at
exploring in depth the relationship between stakeholder thinking and
its legal context, particularly with regard to how the law supports
attention to stakeholders. 190

185.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
For instance, see Donaldson & Preston, supra note 7, at 87. Although
Donaldson and Preston do not explore the ramifications of legislation on stakeholder
thinking in detail, they do take note of relevant changes in the legal landscape. See id.
188.
Although stakeholder relationships have been mentioned previously, there
has been insufficient development of their importance with regard to the development
of stakeholder management. See generally C.L. Bendheim et al., Determining Best
Practices in Corporate-StakeholderRelations Using Data Envelopment Analysis: An
Industry-Level Study, 37 BUS. & SOC'Y 305 (1998).
189.
See, e.g., A.B. Carroll & J. Nasi, Understanding Stakeholder Thinking:
Themes from a Finnish Conference, 6 BUS. ETHICS: EuR. REV. 46, 72 (1997) ('This interest
or stake might be manifested as a legal or moral claim on the organization. Legal stakes
are established by the accepted legal system extant in a country."). See also A.B.
CARROLL, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: ETHICS AND STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 60 (1993).

This right might be a legal right to certain treatment rather than a legal claim
of ownership such as that of a shareholder. Legal rights might include the
right of due process (to get an impartial hearing) or the right to privacy (not to
have his or her privacy invaded or abridged). The right might be thought of as
a moral right, such as that expressed by an employee.
Id.; see also M.B.E. Clarkson, A Stakeholder Frameworkfor Analysing and Evaluating
CorporateSocial Performance, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 92, 103 (1995) ("When there is no
such legislation or regulation, an issue may be a stakeholder issue, but it is not
necessarily a social issue. A test of whether an issue has become a social issue is the
presence or absence of legislation or regulation.").
190.
But see E.W. Orts, A North American Legal Perspective on Stakeholder
Management Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW (E.W. Orts ed., 1997). See
generally R. Marens & A. Wicks, Getting Real: Stakeholder Theory, Managerial
Practice,and the General Irrelevanceof Fiduciary Duties Owed to Shareholders, 9 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 273 (1999). Orts, among a handful others, has addressed the relationships
between stakeholder thinking and the law. See Orts, supra. More recently, Marens
and Wicks have argued that standing legal principles, case precedent, and legislation
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The lens of the stakeholder model offers a useful vehicle for
viewing firms in order to understand better the range of
responsibilities firms have to stakeholders. The reality is that the
firm is not in the center of all pertinent relationships, and that
relationships are not merely bilateral. 191 In fact, the relationships
that emerge out of firm operations are more accurately described as
an interconnected web of relationships. 1 92 A network model is thus
more useful as a model, particularly when advancing principles of
corporate citizenship. In such a model, the firm is itself a stakeholder
of firm operations, and the firm stands opposite its stakeholders in
relationships, just as they are in relationships with one another. It is
the intermingling of all of these overlapping relationships that
constitutes the operations of the firm.

do not inherently preempt stakeholder thinking. See Maren & Wicks, supra, at 276.
They also suggest that support for stakeholder thinking can be found in the law. See
id. at 280.
191.
Thomas M. Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics
and Economics, 20 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 404, 407 (1995).
192.
Id.
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C. Stakeholder Thinking vs. the Law
Until recently, stakeholder thinking has developed with only
nominal reference to the legal environment in which businesses
operate. 193 This is largely the result of traditional interpretations of
fiduciary law and shareholder primacy, which ostensibly preclude
attention to non-shareholder stakeholder concerns. 194
This is
starting to change, however. Although the structuring of corporate
relationships, specifically with regard to shareholders and managers,
has not officially been altered, managers, through skillful decisionmaking, have demonstrated that they can simultaneously attend to
the concerns of both shareholders and other stakeholders. 195 This is
important because managers are human beings, and, as such, they
have natural moral inclinations. While the corporate entity is
arguably fictitious, its effects on stakeholders are real. Although laws
do not always coincide with our moral principles, they should leave
room for us to adhere to our moral principles within the context of the
law.
An interesting shift in legal thinking occurred during the
1980s. 196 Within a short period of time, more than half the states in
the United States adopted so-called "constituency statutes." 197 These
statutes-drafted in virtually identical language-expressly permit
managers to consider the interests of certain "constituents"
(stakeholders) during certain situations. 198 Numerous scholars, both
business and legal, have speculated about the influence of
constituency statutes. 99 Foremost among the legal scholars to
recognize the relevance of this phenomenon has been Eric Orts. 200 He
traced the stockholder/stakeholder controversy back to the Berle-

193.
Tara J. Radin, Stakeholder Theory and the Law (1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Darden Graduate School of Business Administration) (on file with
author).
194.
Id.
195.
See supra note 171.
196.
See supra note 171.
197.
M. Kelly, Laws Require Directors to Take Wider View on Takeover Offers, STAR
TRIB., Nov. 27, 1995, at Cl. See also E.W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting
CorporateConstituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 17 (1992); T.L. Fort, Corporate
Constituency Statutes: A Dialectical Interpretation, 15 J. L. & COM. 257 (1995); J.
Biancalana, Defining the Proper CorporateConstituency: Asking the Wrong Question, 59 U.
CIN. L. REV. 425 (1990); J.J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97 (1991); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees
as Stakeholders Under State NonshareholderConstituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45
(1991).

198.
199.
200.

See supra note 177.
Orts, supra note 197, at 16.
Id.
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Dodd debate of the early 1900s, which was only temporarily
reconciled. 20 1 A number of scholars initially viewed constituency
20 2
statutes as holding the potential for change in corporate practices.
While this may be true, such expectations have yet to be realized. In
fact, the existence of such statutes has proved extremely
20 3
controversial.
Constituency statutes are arguably less important than what
they represent, that is, a shift in legal thinking toward recognition
that managerial decision-making governed solely by shareholder
concerns is overly myopic. 20 4
For example, if managers make
promises to employees regarding long-term employment, it is
arguably morally wrong to break those promises in the interests of
shareholders by allowing mass layoffs or a takeover that causes
layoffs. In some states, this would actually constitute actionable
harm to the employees. 20 5 In fact, courts in many states are
increasingly recognizing rights of employees linked to their reliance
20 6
on workplace guarantees.
The emergence of constituency statutes has provoked
questioning of the disparity between how laws regulate business and
how businesses actually operate. 20 7 While corporate laws do not
protect non-shareholder stakeholders in general, the fact of the
matter is that businesspeople generally do. 20 It tends to be assumed
that good managers consider stakeholder relationships in their shortand long-term decision-making, even though corporate law does not
20 9
demand that they do so.

201.
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
202.
See R.M. Hart & C.M. Degener, Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 12, 1990, at 15. But see M.P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate
Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461 (1992); L.E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992);
R.S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156, 1170
(1993).
203.
See generally L.J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating
Corporate Constituency Statutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1

(1998); S.M. Bainbridge, InterpretingNonshareholderConstituency Statutes, 19 PEPP.
L. REV. 971 (1992); W. W. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical
Case for Constituency Rights, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449 (1993); G.V. Stange,
Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes: Legend or Lie?, 11
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461 (1994); C. Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for
Perspective, 46 BUS. LAW. 1355 (1991).
204.
See Orts, supra note 197, at 20.
205.
Id. at 29-30.
206.

PATRICIA

WERHANE

ET

AL.,

EMPLOYMENT

AND

EMPLOYEE

RIGHTS

(forthcoming 2004). See Chapters 2 and 3 regarding exceptions to employment at will.
See also T.J. Radin & P.H. Werhane, The Public/PrivateDistinction and the Political
Status of Employment, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 245 (1996).
207.
D.G. Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 277, 283
(1998). See also Donaldson & Preston, supra note 7, at 68.
208.
See supra note 177.
209.
See supra note 177.
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In addition, it is important to keep in mind the conscious steps
taken to protect stakeholders through the passing of specific
legislation (e.g., environmental protection laws, consumer protection
laws, employment laws, security laws, and so on). Such legislation
plays an integral role in shaping the environment in which
stakeholder relationships exist. 210 Legislation often serves to bolster
stakeholder claims, and it serves to trump shareholder primacy as a
guiding principle in the situations where it operates. 211 Indeed,
various pieces of state and federal legislation actually create, sustain,
and maintain many vital business-related operations and stakeholder
212
relationships.
Further, it is essential to keep in mind the global nature of
business. While each country is governed by its own laws, there are
perceivable trends and countries often model legislation after one
another. 213 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for example, long
considered an anomaly, is now serving as a model for international
legislation also directed toward the fight against corruption. 214 It is
also important to recognize that the U.S. model is not necessarily the
dominant model overseas, particularly in Europe and Asia, where
215
non-shareholder stakeholders are specifically recognized.
Corporate law is merely one legal vehicle through which
corporations and stakeholders are regulated. 2 16 Examination of other
bodies of law, such as federal and state legislation, as well as the U.S.
Constitution as it has been found to relate to corporations, reveals
that shareholder interests and fiduciary responsibilities are not the
only concerns that managers are required to consider. 2 17 While
corporate law might appear to show preference to shareholders, U.S.
law as a whole is consistent in many ways with stakeholder
218
thinking.

210.
211.

See supra note 177.
See supra note 177.

212.

See supra note 177.

213.
See supra note 177.
214.
Smith Brandon Int'l, Inc., Common Sense & the FCPA (Feb. 2000), at
http://www.smithbrandon.com/news/febOO.htm.
215.
But see, regarding alternative approaches abroad, A.F. Conrad, Corporate
Constituencies in Western Europe, 21 STETSON L. REV. 73 (1991). See also A.A.
Sommer, Jr., Defining the Corporate Constituency: Corporate Governance in the
Nineties: Managers vs. Institutions, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 357 (1995).
216.
Norfolk Educ. and Action for Dev., A Stakeholder Approach to Business
(2001), at http://www.jusbiz.org/articles/stake.shtml.
217.
See Orts, supra note 197, at 17.
218.
See supra note 177.
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IV. STAKEHOLDER THINKING AND LAW: BRIDGING THE GAP

Shareholder primacy is no longer either a satisfying answer or
an insurmountable obstacle to the challenges of managerial decisionmaking. The reality is that not all managerial decisions are about
bottom line profitability. 219 In addition, managerial decisions and
220
determinations are not clear-cut, in either the short- or long-term.
Indeed, many decisions involve investments in relationships that pay
221
off only over time.
Corporations clearly serve societal roles beyond pure shareholder
wealth-maximization, with the tempered support of both legislators
and jurists. 222 State and federal legislation identifies and affords
protection for competing concerns, and judges often sanction
unconventional corporate activities, as long as they cannot be
construed as causing direct interference with shareholder profits, by
deferring to managerial discretion. 22 3 The legal environment of
business enterprises is not as unfriendly to stakeholder thinking as is
frequently assumed.
A. History Revisited
In many ways it is somewhat ironic that traditional
interpretations of the corporation treat it as an individual-based
profit-making enterprise, for the corporate form was originally
created as a contributor to the community. 224 The purpose of most of
the early corporations (at least through the middle of the 19th
''225
century) reinforced the image of the corporation as "artificial.
Few of the early firms were incorporated for purely private business
objectives. 22 6 On the contrary, early corporations tended to serve
public roles. 227 Many were charitable and municipal enterprises,
others were privately-owned banking, insurance, and public utility
entities. 228 In other words, like the legal system, early corporations
tended to promote the general public welfare. 229 The pursuit of
incorporation for private, profit-making purposes was initially viewed

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

See supra note 216.
See supra note 177.
See supra note 177.
See supra note 177.
See supra note 177.
Davis Millon, Theories of the Corporation,1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 206 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 207.
Id.
HURST, supra note 20, at 134-35. See also Millon, supra note 224, at 207.
Millon, supra note 224, at 207.
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with suspicion. 230 During the mid-1800s, there was fear that the
2 31
presence of corporations threatened the economic balance of power.
Such concerns thus contributed to the passing of general
incorporation statutes, which, in term, made incorporation more
232
accessible and made them seem less discriminatory.
The gradual emergence of corporations as for profit enterprises
caused the courts to determine what constitutes fair business
practices. 233
As the courts wrestled with what constitutes fair
business practices, one court in 1909 confronted a situation where
someone went into business in order to put someone else out of
business. 234 The court held that this does not constitute a proper
business purpose,
Men cannot always, in civilized society, be allowed to use their own
property as their interests or desires may dictate without reference to
the fact that they have neighbors whose rights are as sacred as their
own. The existence and well-being of society require that each and
every person shall conduct himself consistently with the fact that he is
a social and reasonable person. The purpose for which a man is using
his own property may thus sometimes determine his rights. 235

In other words, there is the expectation that business enterprises
will reflect profit-generation as a goal. 236 At the same time, the court
also recognized the connectedness of business enterprises to other
stakeholders, such as the community, and held that it was wrong for
the community to be left without a service being provided as a result
of unfair competition. 237 While stakeholders are not given general
rights within business enterprises, jurisprudence nevertheless
reflects an implicit understanding that their concerns will not be
238
completely ignored.
B. Rethinking FiduciaryLaw
Current scholarship indicates that fiduciary law is not
necessarily the "linchpin" of corporate law. 239 At the very least, it has
240
been misinterpreted and applied more broadly than is warranted.

230.
Id.
231.
Id.
232.
Id. at 207-08.
233.
Id. at 209.
234.
Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946, 947 (Minn. 1909).
235.
Id.
236.
See id.
237.
Id.
238.
Id.
239.
Henry. N. Butler & Larry. E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti.Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1990).
240.
Id.
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According to Richard Marens and Andrew Wicks, fiduciary law does
not inherently exclude attention to stakeholders other than
shareholders. 241 As Marens and Wicks accurately pointed out, the
roots of the term go back to times when managerial indiscretion was
feared. 24 2 It is rooted, therefore, in an attempt to prevent managers
from self-dealing, more than in an effort to distinguish between
stakeholders and preclude attention to non-shareholder stakeholder
243
considerations.
In addition, as Marens and Wicks explained, fiduciary duty is no
longer only between managers and shareholders. 24 4 In 1996, the
Supreme Court in Varity v. Howe held that a corporation had
breached its fiduciary duty to employees as a result of a fiscally
irresponsible reorganization. 245
While, to date, this remains a
somewhat isolated instance, it reflects changing attitudes. 246 There
is growing recognition that firms and their managers have a broader
range of obligations than anticipated by fiduciary law as applied to
247
shareholders.
The presence of fiduciary relationships does not preclude the
existence of other stakeholder relationships. 248
Focusing on
shareholders, at the expense of other stakeholders, ignores the
potential financial consequences of those relationships. 249 It can be
argued that, in order to fulfill fiduciary obligations in the interests of
shareholder profitability, stakeholder relationships must be taken
250
into account.
C. CorporatePersonhood
"The 'corporation,' itself is born, lives and dies all by and upon
paper," asserted Dean Edwin R. Latty. 25 1 "What is wanted, then, is a
statutory chart-blueprint to tell the decision-makers what they can do
252
and how to do it-anything from a stock option to a merger."
While state corporate codes continue to treat corporations as fictitious
entities, other areas of the law (particularly federal law) recognize

241.
Richard Marens & Andrew Wicks, Getting Real: Stakeholder Theory,
Managerial Practice, and the General Irrelevance of Fiduciary Duties Owed to
Shareholders,9 Bus. ETHICS Q. 273, 275 (1999).
242.
Id.
243.
Id.
244.
Id. at 276.
245.
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1070 (1996).
246.
Marens & Wicks, supra note 241, at 248.
247.
Id. at 250.
248.
Id. at 251.
249.
Id. at 257.
250.
Id.
251.
Elvin R. Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?,
50 CORNELL L.Q. 599, 601 (1965).
252.
Id.
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corporations as legal persons with protected legal rights.2 53 Legal
"personhood" has emerged, for the most part, during this century.2 54
Courts have gradually carved out specific rights and responsibilities
to be attributed to and enforced for the corporation as a separate
2 55
entity.
"Personhood," in U.S. law, is not restricted to humans. 256 While
it is not officially limited by factors such as race, religion, or gender,
257
personhood, at least according to U.S. law, is limited by age.
Minors (people under 18 years of age) are not considered responsible
for their actions, in most instances their parents (or guardians) are
considered accountable for their behavior.2 58 This is generally the
case, though there are exceptions. 259 For example, some older minors
260
are sentenced and punished as adults for serious criminal offenses.
Minors are not bound by promises they make (i.e., purchases). 261 In
addition, personhood is also limited by mental capacity. 262 The U.S.
legal system provides a criminal defense for insanity. In theory, at
least, mentally handicapped people are not able to conduct adequate
moral reasoning, and, therefore, they cannot be punished as if they
could. 263 This is not to suggest that the U.S. legal system necessarily
handles diminished capacity properly, but that is another issue.
What is relevant here is that U.S. law does at least acknowledge the
26 4
relationship between mental capacity and moral culpability.
While the legal and moral spheres intersect at places, they are
not the same. 265 Numerous legal regulations concern activities that,
while they might not be socially productive or constructive, are not
inherently immoral. 266

According or protecting legal rights and

responsibilities is, therefore, not necessarily linked to moral rights
and responsibilities (though there is often some sort of

253.

Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of

a Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1753 (2001).

254.
Id.
255.
Id.
256.
Id. at 1747.
257.
See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 550-53 (2000).
258.
Id. at 547.
259.
See id. at 583.
260.
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See id. at 553.
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W. Lawrence Fitch & Susan R. Steinberg, Competency to Stand Trial and
CriminalityResponsibility, 36 MD. B.J. 14, 15 (2003).
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264.
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265.
Constance E. Bagley, The Ethical Leader's Decision Tree, 81 HARV. BUS.
REV. 18, 18-19 (2003).
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John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265, 301-02 (2001).
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relationship). 267 The law is, arguably, a pragmatic guide or tool,
while morality is about "right" or "good" behavior.2 68 The law does
not necessarily aim at (traditionally understood) fairness, but at
predictability and practicality. 269 Contractual disputes, for example,
are often not adjudicated according to who deserves the penalty or
270
additional cost, but according to who can bear it more easily.
It is the U.S. legal system that identifies the corporation as a
"legal" person, though admittedly "fictitious. 2 71
Treating
corporations as legal "persons" thus allows the legal system to enforce
rights and responsibilities for the corporation. 272 In other words, the
corporation, as a legal person, has become a stakeholder, in and of
itself.
The duplicity of the corporation, as a stakeholder with its own
concerns and as the intersection of multiple relationships between
stakeholders with their own separate concerns, is underscored by the
treatment of corporations by jurists. 273 In deciding the cases that
come before them, courts first determine whether a corporation is
acting as legal person or is serving merely as an umbrella for other
274
stakeholders' behavior.
Basically, a legal person is someone or something subject to legal
provisions. 2 75 Interestingly, a corporation can be considered a legal
person with regard to some provisions, and not with regard to
others.27 6
Although legal personhood is distinct from moral
personhood, the considerations that go into determining whether a
corporation is a moral person are relevant with regard to the
determination of whether a corporation is a legal person. 27 7

267.
See Legal Rights Are NOT Moral Values!, MANDATE MAG., (Feb. 1-8, 2001),
available at http://www.mandatemagazine.org.
268.
Bagley, supra note 265.
269.
See William M. Wiecek, American Jurisprudence After the War: "Reason
Called Law",37 TULSA L. REV. 857, 866 (2002).
270.
See, e.g., Coase, supra note 80.
271.
John P. Kelly, Business Litigation in Corporations, Close Corporations,
Partnerships,and UnincorporatedAssociations, in BUSINESS LITIGATION IN FLORIDA
§18.1, §18.51 (2001).
272.
What We Talk About, supra note 253, at 1753-54.

273.
Roberta S. Karmel, Duty to the Target: Is an Attorney's Duty to the
Corporationa Paradigmfor Directors?, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 698 (1988).
274.
See, for example, Perry v. Stitzer Buick GMC, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 1282 (Ind.
1994). In Perry, the court refused to find a corporation liable for racial discrimination,
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corporate policy endorsing such behavior.
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BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (7th ed. 1999).
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See, e.g., Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117,
156 (2000).
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See generally Peter A. French, The Corporationas a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207
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Jurists have confronted numerous questions regarding the
applicability of constitutional provisions to corporations. 278 In many
instances, the courts have found that corporations are included
among the legal persons intended to be protected (the court has
already confronted a host of questions concerning the Constitutional
status of the corporation). 2 79 Rights and responsibilities attributed to
corporations tend to correspond to the constitutional protections
afforded to human persons. 28 0 Corporations are not guaranteed

PROVISION
Art. 1, § 10,
cl. 1
Art. III, § 2,
cl. 1

NATURE
Impairment of
Contracts
Diversity of
Citizenship
Jurisdiction

RESULT
Corporations are protected. Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1810).
Even though the corporation is an "artificial" person,
it is considered a citizen of the state where it is
incorporated or presumed to have citizenship.
Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.)
314 (1853); Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 497, 557-58 (1844).

Art. IV, @ 2

Privileges and
Immunities
Freedom of
Speech

Corporations are not protected. Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 517 (1839).
Corporate speech is protected, although the corporation
as speaker is not. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1968).
Corporations are protected. Oklahoma Press
PublishingCo. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
Corporations are not protected. Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85 (1974); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1
(1970); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
Corporations are not protected. United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
Corporations are protected. Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Minneapolis &
St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
Corporations are protected. Pembina Consol.
Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,
125 U.S. 181 (1888); Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1986).
Corporations are not protected. States v. Hague,
307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939); Western TurfAss'n v.
Greenberg,204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907).

1st
Amendment
4th
Amendment
5th
Amendment

Unreasonable
Searches and
Seizures
selfincrimination

5th
Amendment
5th and 14th
Amendments

Double
Jeopardy
Due Process

5th and 14th
Amendments

Equal
Protection of
the Laws

14th
Amendment

Privileges and
Immunities

Anything They Do, 2 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 1 (1983). Among the more persuasive
arguments is that proposed by Patricia H. Werhane, that corporations are not moral
persons, but are "secondary moral agents." PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS,
AND CORPORATIONS 4-27 (1985).

20031

THE CHALLENGE OF CORPORA TE CITIZENSHIP

protection as human persons, but they are afforded protection similar
28 1
to human persons.
For example, courts have extended protection to corporations for
28 2
behavior encompassed by the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendments.
The due process rights of corporations have been protected, as have
been their rights to freedom from illegal searches and seizures. 283 In
addition, courts have determined that corporations have citizenship,
even though they are not biological individuals. 284 Where courts have
refused to recognize the rights of corporations, it is regarding
provisions such as double jeopardy and self-incrimination, where it
would serve injustice, not justice, to treat corporations as legal
persons. 28 5 As persons, corporations are more than profit-making
enterprises.
D. Allowances in the Law for CorporateResponsibilities
Most of the dialogue surrounding stakeholders and the law refers
to the rights of stakeholders (i.e., protecting them from harm). 28 6 On
the other side, there is also the perspective of the corporation's ability
to make contributions for their benefit2 8 7. Such contributions often
take the form of corporate giving, also known as corporate
philanthropy. 288
Interestingly, a legal justification for corporate
donations has been developed, which dates back to the 1930s. 28 9 The
institution of financial incentives (such as tax breaks) have provided

278.
See chart supra.
279.
Id.
280.
School Choice and State Constitutions, supra note 276, at 158.
281.
Id.
282.
See, e.g., Stephen G. Wood & Brett G. Scharffs, Applicability of Human
Rights Standards to Private Corporations:An American Perspective, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
531, 547-53 (2002).
283.
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (holding that a
corporation is a person within the meaning of the equal protection and due process of
law clauses); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well and homes and sustaining a
corporation's challenge to the search of its headquarters).
284.
Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88-92 (1809).
285.
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1977)
(protecting textile corporation from retrial in criminal antitrust action based upon Fifth
Amendment double jeaopardy clause); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (rejecting
a corporation's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination).
286.
See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998).
287.
See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Allen Farrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 1191, 1198 (2002).
288.
Id. at 1191.
289.
See, e.g., Hayden W. Smith, If Not Corporate Philanthropy, Then What?, 41
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 757, 758-61 (1997).
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a business-related purpose, and the 1st Amendment has 29been
0
interpreted as empowering corporations to make corporate gifts.
The purpose here is not to argue against corporate giving, which
is the subject of much debate, 29 1 but to suggest that there are broader
ramifications. If managers are allowed to funnel corporate funds into
causes they deem appropriate, then it should also be appropriate for
them to make similar decisions regarding other stakeholders-not
just the recipients of gifts. 292 It only makes sense that, within the
context of permissible corporate giving, that managers not only be
allowed but be expected to consider the array of stakeholders
interests that affect and are affected by the operations of business
2 93
enterprises.
Further, it is essential to keep in mind that stakeholders both
affect and are affected by business enterprises. 294 It can be argued
that corporate giving enables firms to invest in stakeholders to
provide for future returns. 295 Corporate giving to causes such as arts
and education programs, for example, helps to enrich the community
in which firms operate. 296 This can lead to a stronger potential
workforce from which to draw. 297 This is only one example. The
broader message is that corporate philanthropy, as a legally
allowable choice for managers, indicates that the law is not
298
antithetical to stakeholder thinking.

E. Stakeholder Thinking and the Law
The reality is that stakeholder thinking does not conflict with
the law as much as it can appear at first blush. 299 First, there are
short- and long-term consequences of decision-making. 30 0 Ignoring
stakeholder concerns might not affect short-term performance, but it
301
If
can have a serious negative impact on long-term performance.
we have not learned anything else from the experiences of such
companies as Enron, Arthur Andersen, and WorldCom, we should

Id.
290.
291.
See, e.g., Brudney & Farrell, supra note 287, at 1191.
292.
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy from a Corporate
GovernancePerspective, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1091, 1099 (1997).
See, e.g., John Danley, Beyond Manageralism: After the Death of the
293.
CorporateStatesperson, Bus. ETHICS Q., Special Issue 1, 1999, at 25.
See, e.g., FREEMAN, supranote 15, at 126.
294.
Fisch, supra note 292, at 1104.
295.
Smith, supra note 289, at 765.
296.
Id.
297.
Fisch, supra note 292, at 1096.
298.
299.
Id.
300.
FREEMAN, supra note 15, at 99; L.T. HOSMER, MORAL LEADERSHIP IN
BUSINESS (1994).

301.

Id. at 73-74.
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This is true for
have learned that life catches up to you. 30 2
individuals, organizations, and society at large.
This is what has often been
Second, life is complex. 30 3
overlooked during much of the traditional debate, which has focused
on shareholders and other stakeholders as individuals or groups 30of4
individuals with regard for combined effects of their interaction.
Complicated networks of stakeholder relationships underlie business
enterprises and influence their performance. 30 5 In addition, contrary
to Freeman's original hub-and-spoke model, the firm is not in the
center of all of those relationships. 30 6 Perhaps if the firm were, then
shareholder primacy might make sense, but the reality is that
numerous stakeholder relationships exist that affect operations over
which the firm does not have control. 30 7 Stakeholder thinking
therefore enables business enterprises to remain dynamic. 30 8 Paying
attention only to shareholders limits the ability of managers to
counter relationships that threaten its performance, and to recognize
and develop relationships that can protect the firm over the longterm.

309

Third, the law keeps itself in check. Corporate law is not the
only legal constraint on managerial behavior. 3 10 The presence of
other checks and balances-such as the Constitution, judicial
decisions, and state and federal legislation-indicates that managers'

For a discussion of the impact of the Enron situation, see J.N. Gordon,
302.
What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002). According to
Gordon,
The Enron matter will prove to be a very important event in the history of
American shareholder capitalism. Many of the important institutions were
subjected to a stress test at a particular firm and the outcome was poor....
But Enron also reminds us that there is a problem that cannot be solved, but
can only be contained, in the tension between imperfectly fashioned incentives
and self-restraint.
Id. at 1249-50.
303.
A growing number of business scholars have started drawing upon
scientific thinking, in domains such as physics (chaos theory), in order to emphasize
the inherent complexity in life and business so as to train business practitioners to
manage this complexity in order to use it to their advantage. See, e.g., M.J. WHEATLEY,
LEADERSHIP AND THE NEW SCIENCE 34-42 (1992).
304.
Smith, supra note 286, at 277-78.
FREEMAN, supra note 15, at 24-26.
305.
See Radin, supra note 193.
306.
307.
See, e.g., Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Law Constituency Status: Hollow
Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 102-04 (1999).
308.
Id. at 103.
309.
Id. at 103-04.
310.
FREEMAN, supra note 15, at 25.
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fiduciary responsibilities encompass protecting shareholder interests
31
within the context of the broader legal environment.
Fourth, the law is dynamic. Changes take place, both through
legislation and judicial interpretation, within our legal environment.
While the foundational principles tend to remain constant, the
interpretation and application of the law is an ongoing process,
particularly as unanticipated events occurred.3 12 Take, for example,
whistleblowing.
The doctrine of employment-at-will does not
anticipate the problems an employee will confront when he or she
reports illegal activities taking place in the workplace.3 13 Judges and
legislatures have thus intervened in order to provide protection for
whistleblowers so that they do not place their employment in
jeopardy by participating in the enforcement of the law.3 14 In some
instances, the law has to catch up with morality. This is what is
happening with regard to a number of stakeholders.
Fifth, human beings are moral beings. It can be argued that
corporate law does not demand that managers ignore their moral
intuitions. 3 15
While managers are specifically forbidden from
prioritizing their personal interests, it is to be expected that
managers will exercise their moral reasoning as part of their decisionmaking. 316 Managers are hired because of their decision-making
abilities-because of their skills and abilities and who they are as
individuals.3 17 To place upon them an intractable mandate of a sole
guiding principle (shareholder primacy) simply does not make
sense. 318 If shareholder returns were the only consideration, then
there would be a management algorithm, not a human manager, at
the helm.3 19 The reality is that shareholder concerns are a subset of
the broader category of concerns that managers must confront, and
managers distinguish themselves according to their adeptness at
balancing these competing concerns.320

311.
Wood & Scharffs, supra note 282, at 548-64 (discussing that a corporation
is affected by state corporate rights, constitutional provisions, international law, and
standards that the corporation imposes upon itself).
312.
FREEMAN, supra note 15, at 16-17.
313.
See, e.g., Herbster v. N. Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343,
344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating the general rule that an at-will employee may not bring
a claim for retaliatory damages).
314.
See, e.g., Thomas A. Kuczajda, Self Regulation, Socialism, and the Role of
Model Rule 5.1, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 119, 137 (1999).

315.
316.
317.

See, e.g., Danley, supra note 293, at 24.
Id. at 25.
With regard to people as individuals, or "particularized others," see

generally
S. BENHABIB,
SITUATING THE SELF:
POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS (1992).

318.
319.
320.

Smith, supra note 286, at 290-91.
See generally BENHABIB, supra note 317.
Smith, supra note 286, at 290-91.
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Sixth, shareholder primacy no longer provides a useful
imperative for managers. 321 General expectations today are such
that businesses will consider the concerns of an array of
stakeholders-such as through fair employment practices, corporate
3 22
giving to communities, and joint ventures among competitors.
Such initiatives tend to address stakeholder concerns-they enhance
32 3
the values of shares as well.
Bridging the gap between stakeholder thinking and the law is
therefore not as complicated or imposing an endeavor as it might
seem. On the contrary, through inspection of the law as a whole
(beyond state-dictated corporate law), respect for history, and
recognition of ongoing developments within the law, stakeholder
thinking and the law are in many ways consistent and supportive of
3 24
one another.

V. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

The ripple effect of the devastation caused by the tragedy of
September 11 has extended beyond the perimeter of downtown New
York and has affected the lives of a wide constellation of
stakeholders-not only shareholders and victims. The events of
September 11 have also had an impact on employees, competitors,
business partners (suppliers, distributors, and so on), the
environment, and the community in general.3 25 As many downtown
New York firms endured severe physical and psychological distress,
the concerted and combined efforts of multiple stakeholders vastly
326
aided the recovery process.
A. That Day
The collapse of the towers took with them both lives and
businesses. 32 7 Global investment firm Morgan Stanley occupied

321.
Id. at 279.
322.
Id. at 289-90.
323.
Smith, supranote 289, at 763-64.
324.
See, e.g., Don Mayer, Community Business Ethics and Global Capitalism,
38 AM. BUS. L.J. 215, 258 (2001). Mayer notes that there is a meaningful melding of
law and ethics that occurs given the "unique historical relations among business,
governments, people, and the natural environment." Id.
325.
See, e.g., Roger Simon, One Year, U.S NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 11, 2002,
at 4.
326.
Id.
327.
Akel Ismail Kahua, The Twin Towers as Martyrs:A Philosophical Idea and
Some of Its Problems, 7 IsLAMIc L. & CULTURE 83, 94 (2002). The attack on the World
Trade Center claimed 2823 lives and displaced nearly 1200 New York firms. Id.
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roughly a fourth of the floors in the two towers. 328 The towers were
also home to such firms as international legal conglomerate Sidley,
Austin, Brown, & Wood, broker-dealer Cantor Fitzgerald, and
Chicago-based futures and options trading firm, Carr Futures.3 29 Not
all of the firms were U.S., though. 33 0 Some 20 Japanese firms had
offices in the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. 331 In addition,
the concourses and lobbies of the buildings were lined with shopseverything from florists and gift shops to Ben and Jerry's.3 32 As the
buildings crumbled, so disappeared the livelihoods, hopes, and
dreams of thousands of businesspeople, along with all of the physical
evidence and records that business transactions and negotiations had
333
ever taken place there.
Even businesses not directly hit by the attack were forced to
remain closed for days, and in some cases weeks. Another building in
the World Trade Center, #7, which housed the investment bank
Salomon Smith Barney, collapsed within the day on the 11th, and
innumerable other offices suffered serious structural damage. 334 The
3 35
entire downtown New York landscape was permanently altered.
The nature of the tragedy at the World Trade Center was
unique. It was not the first time the towers had been targeted and
harmed.3 36 The problem was that, after the first bombing, the
residents of the World Trade Center had developed a false sense of
security, in that they were confident that harm could not be brought
in through the front door-and it was not. Virtually no one
337
anticipated an attack from outside.
In building the World Trade Center chief architect, Minoru
Yamasaki, led a team of 14 architects who designed the buildings to
be defensible against being hit by a plane. 338 Because of their height,

328.
See, e.g., Bruce v. Bigelow, In Twin Towers, Terrorists Hit Beacon of Global
Capitalism,SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 12, 2001, at A7.
329.
See, e.g., World Trade Center-North Tower Tenants, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept.
12, 2001, at http://www.usatoday.com; World Trade Center-South Tower Tenants,
U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 12, 2001, at http://www.usatoday.com.

330.
See North Tower Tenants, supra note 329; South Tower Tenants, supranote
329.
331.
See North Tower Tenants, supra note 333; South Tower Tenants, supranote
329.
332.
See, e.g., World Trade Center: A City in Towers, CNN, Sept. 12, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001US/09/11l/trade.center.
333.
See, e.g., Margaret C. Fisk, SEC & EEOC: Attack Delays Investigations,
N.Y. LAw., Sept. 17, 2001, available at http://www.nylawyer.com.
334.
See, e.g., World Trade Center Towers Destroyed, INDUS. STANDARD, Sept. 11,
2001, at http://www.thestandard.com.
335.
Kahua, supra note 327, at 93.
336.
Id. at 92.
337.
Bill Keller, Emergency Line: 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A27.
338.
Trade Center Architect Discusses Buildings, CNN, Sept. 12, 2001, at
http://cnn.com.
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an accident was foreseeable to them. 33 9 The buildings were thus
designed like pipes, so that, were a plane to hit, it would travel
through the building without bring the building down. 340 The
buildings were built roughly 30 years ago, though, when the Boeing
707 was the airplane with which to reckon-nothing of the size and
impact of the Boeing 757s that tore into the World Trade Centers this
September had been envisioned. 34 1 In addition, no one foresaw the
malicious intentionality of such a collision with two planes full of
fuel. 3 42

So, while in theory, the buildings were resistant to air

attacks, in fact, they were quite vulnerable. 34 3 In addition, as the fuel
leaked to the cores of the buildings, they appeared to implode, and, as
they did so, it shook the very foundation of buildings within
neighboring blocks. 344 In fact, as a result of the horrific catastrophe,
including the physical damage as well as the gas leaks and power
outages, New York south of 14th Street, including the New York
345
Stock Exchange, was, in an unprecedented event, closed for days.
The picture painted here is one that endeavors to depict some of
the incredible, almost inconceivable, losses endured by the businesses
that had populated lower Manhattan, primarily those in the financial
district. It is, though, barely the tip of the iceberg. It was several
346
days before the smoke over downtown New York even began to lift.

While businesses are now operating again-many from satellite
offices or new locations-things are not the same.
It is important to understand, or at least attempt to determine,
the gravity of what happened to the people and their lives in order to
begin to appreciate the importance of understanding the roles of the
firms from that day onward. Records are gone, and people are
missing, injured, and dead, but the firms still exist-even those
without the support of home or branch locations. 34 7 In fact, the
presence and importance of these firms are arguably even greater in
the wake of the tragedy, for it is now that their citizenship needs to
be felt by the array of stakeholders who depend upon them.

339.
340.

Id.
Id.

341.

Id.

342.
343.

Id.
Id.

344.

Id.

345.
Martha McKay & Karen Mahabir, Stock Exchange Closed Four Days, To
Open Monday, REC. (Bergen City, N.J.), Sept. 16, 2001, at A10; William Sherman &
Brian Kates, Desperate Time for City's New Jobless & Firms in Loan Search, N.Y.
DAILy NEWS, Oct. 1, 2001, at A4.
Robert Dembo, Redefining "Normal",NBC NEWS, at http://www.msnbc.coml
346.
news.
347.
Kevin Flynn et al., For Towers' Refugee Businesses, a Year of Struggle and
Change, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at 24.
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In the months following the disaster, we continued to feel the
effects of September 11.348 The U.S. economy is recovering, but
people, businesses, communities, and countries are still feeling the
consequences. 349 Many people, not just in New York, are out of work,
and new jobs are not easy to find. 350 Others are choosing to change
their jobs. 35 1 The firms formerly located in or around the World
Trade Center not only lost valuable human assets as a result of the
bombings, but they are losing additional employees who were
prompted by the disaster to reconsider their employment choices,
with regard to location, environment, and firm. 35 2 Around the world
firms are creating new policies and procedures, and they are forging
35 3
new sorts of relationships to carry them forward.
B. Stakeholder Concerns
Although the notion of businesses as citizens is not new, it has
gained momentum during the past several years and it is
increasingly viewed as a useful new paradigm for business. 354 The
view is that firms, like people, have responsibilities to the people and
groups of people with whom they are involved. 355 People have
responsibilities based on their citizenship, which makes them subject
to U.S. laws. 3 5 6 Although business firms do not acquire official
citizenship, they are subject to U.S. and international laws for a
number of reasons, such as the process of incorporation. 357 U.S. and
international individuals thus share with U.S. and international
3 58
business firms similar rights and responsibilities.
While there is an innumerable list of affected parties, the
primary stakeholders are the firms resident at the World Trade

348.
See Peter Grant & Motoko Rich, How Damaged is Downtown?-Lower
Manhattan is Fighting for its Future as Jobs Disappear and Companies Move
Elsewhere, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, at B1 (discussing New York's diminished
economy and status as a result of the events of September 11, 2001).
349.
Id.
350.
Id.
351.

Id.

352.
See Flynn et al., supra note 347, at 29 (discussing how businesses formerly
located in the World Trade Center are coping with 9/11).
353.
Id.
354.
David Millon, Frontiers of Legal Thought I: Theories of the Corporation,
1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 216-20.
355.
Id. at 216.
356.
Id.
357.
Id. at 218.
358.
Id.
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Center and the airlines. 359 These firms wear a number of hats, so to
speak, in that, while they are firms in and of themselves, they are
also inter-networked in relationships that position them as neighbors
in the World Trade Center, sometime competitors, partners upon
occasion, and peers. 360 Landlords in downtown New York are having
trouble filling space.3 61 Employers provided psychological counseling
for people having trouble dealing with what happened. 362
In
addition, it is important to keep in mind the clients, customers,
employees, families, and friends of employees. All of these people are
directly affected by what has happened.
With regard to employees, they can be divided into multiple
groups.
First, there is a line that can be drawn between the
employees who were in the building and the employees who were not.
Beyond that, there are the employees based in the affected office (i.e.,
World Trade Center) and those that were not (for those businesses
with multiple offices/branch locations). In addition, there are former
employees, present employees, and future employees.
Former
employees often own stock or share in the pension plan. 363 They,
particularly those who have retired, and not just moved on to
competitors or the like, also tend to hold an emotional attachment to
the firm's reputation. 364 Just as alumni of schools often feel pride
associated with their alma maters, retirees, as "alumni" of firms,
often feel similar emotions with regard to the firms where they
worked.
The government is clearly another important stakeholder. If not
for the rescue personnel dispatched by the government, the number of
lives lost might be even greater. Regardless, these people risked, and
many lost, their lives in order to try to get others to safety. 365 Even
though they were not able to prevent the collapse of the buildings,
they helped get people to safety quickly and expeditiously. 366 The
government is also a stakeholder as a target of the incident, as a
participant in recovery and restoration efforts, and as the moderator

359.
Keith. L. Alexander & Frank Swoboda, Boeing to Cut Up to 30,000 Jobs:
Airlines, Hill Leaders Near Agreement on $17.5 Billion in Aid, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,
2001, at A20.
360.
Amy Baldwin, Record Loss Leaves Wall Street Reeling: Dow Jones Drops
Record 1,370.04 in Week, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 22, 2001, at 1.
361.
Peter Grant, Landlords Let Compassion Trump Profits When Offering
Space to DisplacedFirms, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2001, at A10.
362.
See Kelly Pate, Holiday Stress Levels on the Rise; Terrorism Fears, Poor
Economy Fuel Anxiety, Cigna Survey Finds, DENVER POST, Dec. 7, 2001, at C2.
363.
See, e.g., Lynn Brenner, Double the Pain: Difficult Road Also Awaits
Financiallyfor Survivors who Must Settle Estates, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 23, 2001,
available at http://www.orlandosentinel.com.
364.
Id.
365.
Thousands Pack Tribute to Firefighters,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at A40.
366.
Id.
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of public safety. 367
Foreign governments are also significant
stakeholders-not only because of the foreign firms and people
involved in the tragedy, but also because of the shared threat of
terrorism.
Other firms, such as neighbors, competitors, and partners (i.e.,
collaborators, distributors, and suppliers), are also stakeholders.
They were all affected by what happened, and what was to happen, as
a result of the tremendous losses felt by the business communityparticularly the small mom-and-pop stores. The New York Stock
Exchange, for example, while not directly hit, was nevertheless forced
to close for days. 3 68
This closure created formidable economic
challenges, both nationally and globally. 369 Indeed, the widespread
closings and the tremendous impact on people and lifestyle choices,
such as travel and tourism, had serious, long-term economic
370
ramifications on all businesses.
In addition, other charities also suffered in the consequences of
September 11.371
With no disrespect intended toward the
tremendous losses felt, there are other important causes, and, as
many contributions were redirected toward victims of September 11,
372
other charities suffered.
What about the children? 373 An ongoing concern involves how to
answer the questions of children. What do we want to teach them
regarding what has happened, and how do we help them recover from
the nightmare?
374
Finally, the community as a stakeholder cannot be ignored.
The global, national, local, and Internet communities were all
affected by this tragedy. In the hours that followed the incident,
websites emerged and web conversations developed that endeavored

367.
Thomas Mulligan, A Year After: New York a City in Flux as its Economy
Struggles, Jobs Lost After Attack Have Yet to Return, Businesses are Cautious and
Government Budgets are Being Cut, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, at C1 (discussing
economic effects of 9/11 on the government).
368.
Christine Van Dusen, Financial World Tied to Trade Center, ATLANTA
CONST., Sept. 12, 2001, at D1.

369.
McKay & Mahabir, supra note 345, at A10.
370.
Mulligan, supra note 367, at C1.
371.
Lisa Gubernick & Anne Marie Chaker, Charities Not Linked to Attack
Victims Worry About a Decrease in Donations,WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2001, at B2.
372.
Id.
373.
Karen W. Arenson, Schools Offer Free Tuition to Children of the Victims,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at A10.
374.
Jon E. Hilsenrath, Grief Commutes From 'Ground Zero' to Manhasset,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2001, at B9.
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to reconnect friends and families. 3 75 This event touched people
376
around the world; it was not isolated its reach.
The complete array of stakeholders obviously encompasses a
wider range than those specifically identified. The tourism industry
and the economy are stakeholders, as are the Palestinians, both in
the Middle East and here. 3 77 And, as painful as it is to remember,
there were pockets of people in the United States, primarily from
other countries, who took joy in the harm that came to the businesses
and people in the World Trade Center. 3 78 While theirs might not be a
stake we wish to protect, it is, nevertheless, a stake to acknowledge,
particularly if we are attempting to complete a full picture.
C. Role of Relationships
In 1984, Freeman identified terrorists as possible stakeholders of
3 79
organizations, and for this he has received considerable criticism.
It is possible to argue that the events of September 11 resulted from
reluctance to recognize the impact of business enterprises on
terrorists. This is not to suggest that business practices should be
compromised for the sake of vocal opposition, or that anyone should
necessarily give in to threats and fear. Recognizing the effects of
decisions on stakeholders empowers managers to anticipate and
prepare for consequences. 380 In this instance, recognizing the threat
of terrorism might have prompted enhanced security measures or
broader policy recommendations.
The importance of stakeholder relationships has emerged as a
3
dominant theme, particularly in the wake of September 11. 81
Multiple stakeholder relationships have been affected and built upon
in order to provide for the recovery of downtown New York and the
environs. 38 2 Relationships between the community (volunteers) and
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the government, for example, have been integral to the rebuilding
effort. 38 3 These relationships include those involving affected firms
as well as relationships among their stakeholders, in which they are
not directly involved. 38 4 It is also important to note that many of the
38 5
people involved in these relationships remained anonymous.
People and organizations made contributions-often without
identifying themselves. 38 6 The volunteers in the brigade to look for
survivors and remains received plentiful food and water, though they
38 7
were rarely told from whom the gifts came.
A number of firms from all over the world have participated in
the relief effort. 388 Wall Street firms have collectively organized
38 9
efforts, even though many are actually industry competitors.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, for example, a Philadelphia law firm,
provided web support and collected donations for Cantor Fitzgerald, a
client. 390 Many firms have contributed money to charities which have
then redistributed the funds among victims. 39 1 Others offered office
392
space, personnel, and supplies.
New York still suffers, and the affected, as well as the
contributors to the recovery effort, continue to outnumber direct
victims. 393 Michael Bloomberg, the Mayor of New York, has recently
announced a plan to spread the tax burden among non-residents who
3 94
work in Manhattan.
A number of individuals, firms, communities, and countries are
contributing to the recovery effort-and not all of them are directly
involved.3 95 Interestingly, a lot of decisions were made purely out of
respect. Newsday, for example, a Long Island-based daily newspaper,
voluntarily chose to refuse ads from funeral parlors in the days
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following September 11, out of respect for the victims-Newsday did
396
not want to take advantage of the tremendous losses.
It will still be months and years before downtown New York even
starts to show signs of recovery.3 97 It is amazing to note the high
levels of voluntary contributions, by individuals and groups, toward
this effort. 398 Separate relationships among a variety of stakeholders
have enabled recovery to progress, and these relationships provide
the link to sustainable peace.

VI. BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, STAKEHOLDERS, AND CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP

The past several years have witnessed a trend toward
emphasizing the stakeholder relationships that influence businesses
and communities, not only on a local or national level, but also on a
truly global scale. 399 The events that led up to the destruction of the
World Trade Center, as well as everything that has occurred sinceemphasize the significance of relationships. In light of the increasing
globalization of business, it is now incumbent upon managers to
consider the international possibilities and effects of their
400
activities.
It is important during this time to keep in mind that, while the
magnitude of what has happened is arguably greater than anything
we have previously experienced, we do have models that can assist us
in our thinking about business moving forward.
Numerous
40 1
It
businesses, such as Malden Mills, have gone through tragedies.
is, therefore, important to build relationships, not just between the
stakeholders of the World Trade Center, but between what we are
experiencing now and what has happened before. An underlying goal
of this Article is to link our developing notion of international
business citizenship with past and future business practices, so that
we can appeal not just to scholarly ideals but also to actual business
decisions and business role models in the development of a theoretical
model.
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40 2

A. Malden Mills

On December 11, 1995, a fire occurred at Malden Mills, a textile
manufacturing plant in Lawrence, Massachusetts. 40 3 The losses were
tremendous. 40 4 Three buildings were destroyed, 36 workers were
injured, and the jobs of 3,000 employees were put in jeopardy in a
40 5
small town that was not easily able to absorb such a consequence.
40 6
CEO Aaron Feuerstein had a strong reputation in the community.
Feuerstein had endeavored to support and save local businesses, had
contributed toward the education of community members, and had
generally improved life in the community. 40 7 He had even extended
lines of credit to local businesspeople. 40 s In the workplace, the
employer-employee relationships were characterized by respect and
dignity-employees felt valued. 40 9 When the tables turned and
Feuerstein confronted disaster, he had already invested in strong
4 10
relationships with multiple stakeholders.
When Feurestein responded, he did so through the relationships
he had developed. 4 11 He worked with the media to identify his
accountability, even though the fire was an accident, and to create
transparency-to communicate what had happened to the wide array
of stakeholders. 412 He continued to pay workers, even though they
413
did not have facilities in which to work.
At the same time, the stakeholder relationships proved
significant. 4 14 The Chamber of Commerce developed a relationship
with employees and other stakeholders through a hotline. 415 In
addition, community members united to set up an independent relief
fund. Customers stood by loyally, and competitors also reportedly
offered assistance. 416 Feuerstein's prior investment in stakeholder
relationships was instrumental in getting Malden Mills through this
difficult time.
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B. Other Business Practices
While Malden Mills is one of the more pronounced examples of
the positive effects of building stakeholder relationships, it is not
unique. 417 It is not uncommon for business enterprises to reach out to
stakeholders. 4 18 Miller Brewing, for example, provided bottled water
to communities in need.4 19 Citibank, like many other companies,
provides volunteer incentives and matching programs for a variety of
causes.4 20 In Indonesia, General Motors employees helped build
houses for flood victims in July 2002.421
What this illustrates is that the responses to such occurrences as
the fire at Malden Mills and the events of September 11 are not outof-the-ordinary, but actually correspond with the moral inclinations of
stakeholders in any number of situations. In reality, members of
business enterprises recognize their connectedness to one another
and other stakeholders, and they make regular contributions as they
develop various relationships.
C. Contributionsto CorporateCitizenship
The situation in the wake of the bombing of the World Trade
Center underscores the interconnectedness of business stakeholders
around the world. To the attackers, the injured did not have faces;
they were targets only because they were, or were associated with,
capitalistic business citizens. 422 The dead and injured participated in
the U.S. and international marketplace, and, for that, they were
4 23
punished.
As terrible as this event has been, it would seem that it also
provides us with an excellent opportunity to explore, discuss, and
determine the essence of corporate responsibilities, in crisis and dayto-day situations. Perhaps we can begin with an analysis of the depth
of responsibilities in this time of crisis, and use it in order to
determine responsibilities day-to-day.
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The situation in September 2001 underscores the need for firms
to recognize their citizenship and their responsibilities to their
stakeholders. These firms were targets because they were business
citizens. They participated in the U.S. marketplace, and for that they
But it is not just the firms who were hurtwere punished.
stakeholders were harmed as well. It is now for the firms, who have
created the relationships and allowed their stakeholders to become
reliant upon them, to take responsibility for piecing things back
together.
Citizenship provides the vehicle for translating stakeholder
responsibilities for managers. 4 24 As a citizen, an individual receives
benefits and acquires certain responsibilities. Business enterprises,
as citizens, receive benefits such as tax breaks and constitutionallyprotected freedoms. 425 In addition, they receive protection from
harm, as individuals do, through local fire and police protection
agencies. 426 In return, business enterprises have the same sorts of
responsibilities as individuals, such as treating others with respect
and to acting responsively. What the notion of citizenship offers
of
stakeholder thinking is a community-based conception
reciprocity. 4 27 In other words, while stakeholder thinking suggests
that firms should pay attention to stakeholders because they affect or
are affected by the firm's operations, citizenship more broadly
indicates that, even if the effects are not clear, responsibilities to
stakeholders also exist as a result of the membership of the firm in a
community in which others are also citizens (with similar benefits
42 8
and responsibilities).
D. Lessons for Managers
Stakeholder thinking and notions of corporate citizenship play a
vital role in broadening managerial vision. There are vital lessons
In the wake of the
from situations such as September 11.
catastrophe, we witnessed the best that we can be, as individuals and
business enterprises. People wanted to go back to work-not for the
salary, necessarily, but because they felt natural connections to their
peers at work. After September 11, people held their loved ones close,
but they grieved alongside their co-workers. In New York, and
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perhaps elsewhere, people started meeting each other's eyes more
often. It was capitalism that was attacked, but it was human beings
who were part of the capitalist endeavors.
Some of the most important lessons involve stakeholder
relationships,
1)
2)

This
Business enterprises cannot exist without stakeholders.
creates an inherent interconnectedness.
Stakeholders affect and are affected by business enterprises. It is
important to consider stakeholders who are affected by business
enterprises because the effects can cause them to engage in
activities that will then affect business enterprises.

3)

The reliance of stakeholders on business enterprises can create the
basis for responsibilities. Many employers have assisted families
of lost wage earners for this reason.

4)

The business enterprise is not involved in all significant
relationships. For example, in the wake of September 11, many
employees sought psychiatric counseling that enhanced their work
performance.
More broadly, many donors contributed to
organizations who then distributed funds to victims. In addition, it
is essential for business enterprises to remain cognizant because
they can be affected by relationships in which they are not directly
involved. Competitors lobbying Congress, for example, can have an
effect on the operations.

5)

Many shareholders are also
Shareholders are stakeholders.
employees, members of the community, and so on. Addressing
stakeholder concerns encompasses some shareholder concerns as
well.

6)

Competitors are stakeholders. Competition does not have to be
In the situation
viewed as competition against one another.
involving Malden Mills, for example, competitors contributed to the
recovery of Malden Mills because the industry is made better off by
the presence of stronger competition--of competitors competing
together.

7)

Life is long. Investments in relationships can pay off in the shortterm, but they hold tremendous potential for the future.

8)

Life is uncertain. Because we do not know what will happen
tomorrow, in terms of either world events or business occurrences,
the stronger the underlying relationships, the better positioned
business enterprises are to respond to what does happen.

It is important, from a business sense, to recognize, manage, and
develop stakeholder relationships-not only because they are
essential in times of crisis, but because they are integral to day-to-day
operations, whether it is obvious or not.
for
does not
offer a formula
Stakeholder thinking
management. 42 9 It does not inherently identify which stakeholders or
stakeholder relationships should be prioritized or which should be
reconcil when they conflict. The purpose of stakeholder thinking is
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not to provide such a formula, but to expand managerial thinking in
order to encompass a wider array of concerns. 430 Managers are hired
because of who they are as moral persons. 431 Stakeholder thinking
emphasizes that managers should be empowered to exercise their
moral thinking in the workplace. 432 It therefore helps to reconcile
business behavior with the natural moral intuitions of most people.
Stakeholder thinking does not inherently conflict with the enterprise
goal of profit generation. 433 In fact, stakeholder thinking supports
profit generation (which benefits shareholders) because it generally
benefits multiple stakeholders. 434 Stakeholder thinking does not
suggest that profits should be ignored in favor of stakeholder
interests. 43 5 Rather, stakeholder thinking merely promotes profit
generation through greater attention to stakeholder concerns.436
Greater long-term profitability can often be achieved by addressing
4 37
stakeholder concerns up front.

VII. CONCLUSION: CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE

Citizenship does not replace individual responsibility. This
Article contributes to an ongoing conversation regarding the roles of
stakeholders in organizations. Since the word "stakeholder" first
became common in business conversations, debate has existed
surrounding the existence of moral responsibilities to stakeholders.
We are individuals first, before we are members of business
enterprises, and it is our personal responsibilities that can, do, and
should shape our consideration of stakeholder interests with regard
In the wake of September 11, as
to the business enterprise.
downtown New York was physically and psychologically crippled, it
was almost as if businesspeople forgot that they were businesspeople,
and they reacted as human beings. What we witnessed during that
time, and somewhat since, is the vitality of stakeholder relationships.
This is consistent with contemporary thinking regarding best
business practices. Business enterprises are increasingly viewed as
systems of relationships that are maintained and nurtured in order to
438
enhance organizational success.
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Connecting this to sustainable peace, as stakeholder
relationships contribute to the sustainability of organizations,
relationships similarly can contribute to the sustainability of a
peaceful society. Conflict erupts following discontent, and people are
discontent when they feel disconnected.
The fortification of
stakeholder relationship thus translates into a step toward
sustainable peace. This allows problems to be addressed on the local
level, so that they can be prevented from escalating into situations
that jeopardize peace. In addition, corporate citizenship emphasizes
increased vigilance. It is not just for governments to monitor peace,
but for business enterprises to self-police as well. As members of
society, which is how the notion corporate citizenship positions them,
they have a stake in peace.
Capitalism has often been painted as immoral, or at least
amoral. On the contrary, there are strong arguments that suggest
439
that capitalism can be viewed as having a strong moral component.
In the wake of September 11, it seems that we witnessed the beauty
of capitalism, for, when disaster struck, stakeholders, already
interconnected, developed additional relationships in order to
participate in the recovery process. If, instead of abandoning those
relationships, we build upon them, that is the first step toward
sustainable peace. On September 11, capitalism was our Achilles
heel-the two unprotected towers on the tip of the island. We can,
though, turn capitalism into our armor. By increasing and enhancing
our connectedness through stakeholder relationships in business, we
can both prevent future attacks and arm ourselves if they do occur.
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